fix(core): 修复启动重复播种 admin key + 配置封存非幂等

根因是 unseal 时序:NewFromConfig 把解密放在最后,而之前几步已经在读凭据。

1. seedKeys 重复播种(生产已累积 4 个同名 admin key)
   seedKeys 用 cfg.Keys[i].Key 与明文 gateway_keys 比对去重,但此时内存里的
   key 还是密文 enc:v1:…,比对永不命中 ⇒ 每次重启追加一个同值 admin key。
   实测:core.New(path) 连续重启,seeded key 数 2→3→4 递增。
   (旧测试用 NewFromConfig 构造全新内存对象,没有「盘上已有密文」这个前提,
    复现不出 —— 必须走 core.New 这条读盘的生产路径。)

2. 启动恒重写 config.yaml
   migratePlaintextSecrets 按内存状态判断,而 Save() 末尾会把内存恢复为明文,
   于是每次调用都判定「还有明文」并重写;注释却自称幂等。
   改为 UnsealSecrets 在解密前记录「盘上是否明文」,SealIfNeeded 据此决定
   是否写回 ⇒ 已封存的配置启动不再落盘。

原测试 TestMigratePlaintextSecretsIsIdempotent 用 ModTime 比较,两次写落在同一
时间戳刻度内就看不出来,所以表现为 ~1/6 概率的 flake 而非稳定失败。已改为比较
文件内容并走真实启动路径(UnsealSecrets + SealIfNeeded),并顺带消除该 flake。

附带更正:先前判断「rebuildRegistry 也会拿到密文 API key」不成立 ——
mergedSources → resolveSourceKey 对每个 source 独立解密(belt-and-braces),
provider 始终拿到明文。unseal 前置仍予保留,以消除对该兜底路径的隐性依赖、
并让 seedKeys 在明文下比较。

判据:
- TestRestartDoesNotDuplicateSeededKeys(敏感:回退顺序必红)
- TestSealingIsIdempotentAcrossStarts(12/12 稳定,原先 1/6 flake)
- TestProvidersGetPlaintextCredentials(钉 provider 必须拿到明文这一不变量)
This commit is contained in:
JianFeeeee
2026-09-28 22:52:51 +08:00
parent 5c58244781
commit 26ea782350
4 changed files with 302 additions and 21 deletions

View File

@ -56,8 +56,26 @@ func NewFromConfig(cfg *config.Config) (*Core, error) {
c.store = config.NewStore(cfg.RuntimeFile)
// Share one box between the runtime store and config.yaml so a single
// master.key seals both files. config.Load left the config holding
// ciphertext (if it was sealed); unseal it now that the box exists.
// ciphertext (if it was sealed); unseal it NOW, before anything reads a
// credential.
//
// ORDER IS LOAD-BEARING. These steps each consume secrets and must run
// after the unseal:
// - seedKeys compares cfg.Keys[i].Key against the plaintext
// gateway_keys entries; with ciphertext keys the comparison never
// matched and every restart appended another duplicate admin key
// (production had four copies of the same admin key).
// - rebuildRegistry hands cfg.Sources[i].APIKey to the providers; with
// ciphertext it built every upstream client with "enc:v1:..." as its
// bearer token.
// Previously the unseal happened at the END of this function, and things
// only appeared to work because seedKeys' Save() unsealed memory as a side
// effect. Removing the redundant saves exposed the real ordering bug.
cfg.AttachSecretBox(c.store.SecretBox())
hadPlaintextSecrets, err := cfg.UnsealSecrets(c.store.SecretBox())
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unseal secrets: %w", err)
}
if err := c.store.Load(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("runtime store: %w", err)
}
@ -79,10 +97,10 @@ func NewFromConfig(cfg *config.Config) (*Core, error) {
if err := c.seedPresetTemplates(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("seed preset templates: %w", err)
}
// Seal any credential still in the clear in config.yaml. Idempotent: an
// already-sealed config is not rewritten, so a normal restart writes
// nothing. This is the only place that rewrites the file on startup.
if err := cfg.NormalizeSecretsForRun(c.store.SecretBox()); err != nil {
// Seal any credential still in the clear in config.yaml. Startup writes
// nothing when the file was already sealed (hadPlaintextSecrets is decided
// from the on-disk state, before the unseal above).
if err := cfg.SealIfNeeded(hadPlaintextSecrets); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("normalize secrets: %w", err)
}
return c, nil