Files
webui4frpc/internal/httpapi/auth.go
jianf eda9bb9597 feat: cluster reliability (leader failover, crash rejoin, key exchange) + auth/users + canvas/forwards enhancements + comprehensive README + API docs
- Cluster: forwardToNext offline detection (leader+non-leader), WatchLeader 1s heartbeat fallback, 409 for standalone nodes, Node.NodeKey key exchange via token ring, ClusterPeers persistence + auto-rejoin, Forward delegates to forwardToNext (bugfix)
- Auth: Basic Auth (flag-creds fast path) + bcrypt users (admin/viewer) + Bearer API keys (read/write/admin scope)
- Frontend: UsersView (accounts+API keys), ClusterView (ring/nodeKey/tasks/topology/log), StatusView (group management, per-proxy status), CanvasView (edge toggle/group), PortEdge (disabled/group labels)
- API: handlers split (canvas/forwards/users/logs), canvas export/import, forwards group start/stop/assign/delete, cluster endpoints
- Docs: comprehensive README rewrite (all flags/APIs/auth/cluster), docs/cluster-api.md (cluster management API reference)
- Deploy: run-cluster.sh now 4-node ring + 1 isolated standalone, test-forward.sh updated for 4 nodes
- Removed plan.md (design notes consolidated into README + API docs)
2026-08-19 21:09:24 +08:00

130 lines
4.7 KiB
Go

package httpapi
import (
"context"
"crypto/subtle"
"net/http"
"strings"
"webui4frpc/internal/store"
)
// identity is the authenticated principal for a request, stashed in the
// request context so handlers can read who/what level the caller is.
//
// Type is one of:
// - "user": a row in the users table, authenticated via Basic + bcrypt.
// - "service": the -user/-password flag creds (inter-node cluster traffic
// and bootstrap), authenticated via a constant-time compare.
// - "key": an API key, authenticated via Bearer + sha256 lookup.
//
// Level is the effective access tier: "read" | "write" | "admin". For users it
// derives from the role (viewer -> read, admin -> admin); for keys it is the
// key's scope; for the service identity it is always admin (the flags are the
// built-in operator).
type identity struct {
Type string `json:"type"` // "user" | "service" | "key"
Name string `json:"name"` // username / flag user / key label
Level string `json:"level"` // "read" | "write" | "admin"
UserID int64 `json:"userId"` // users.id for Type=="user"|"key"
}
type ctxKey struct{}
// identityFrom returns the authenticated identity from the request context,
// or a zero identity (Level=="") when unauthenticated.
func identityFrom(r *http.Request) identity {
if v, ok := r.Context().Value(ctxKey{}).(identity); ok {
return v
}
return identity{}
}
// levelRank orders the access tiers: read < write < admin. Unknown = 0.
func levelRank(level string) int {
switch level {
case "read":
return 1
case "write":
return 2
case "admin":
return 3
}
return 0
}
// roleLevel maps a user role to an access level (viewer -> read, admin -> admin).
func roleLevel(role string) string {
if role == "admin" {
return "admin"
}
return "read"
}
// hasLevel reports whether the request's identity meets minLevel. Handlers
// serving both read and mutating methods on one path use this to gate the
// mutating branch (the route itself is registered at the read level so that
// viewer GETs succeed, then PUT/POST/DELETE branches re-check here).
func hasLevel(r *http.Request, minLevel string) bool {
return levelRank(identityFrom(r).Level) >= levelRank(minLevel)
}
// forbidden writes a 403 with a small JSON body.
func forbidden(w http.ResponseWriter) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"forbidden: insufficient scope"}`))
}
// auth wraps a handler with authentication AND authorization. It accepts either
// HTTP Basic (users table bcrypt, with a flag-creds admin fast path that keeps
// inter-node cluster traffic working) or a Bearer API key (sha256-looked-up).
// Identities below minLevel get 403; missing/bad credentials get 401.
//
// The flag-creds fast path is checked BEFORE the users table: inter-node token
// relay and the browser-cached Basic header hit it on every request, and a
// bcrypt verify per hop would be wasteful; the flags are the built-in operator
// and are synced into a system=1 admin row by SyncSystemUser anyway, so this
// shortcut grants no privilege that the flags themselves do not already confer.
func (h *Handler) auth(minLevel string) func(http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
need := levelRank(minLevel)
return func(next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var id identity
switch {
case strings.HasPrefix(r.Header.Get("Authorization"), "Basic "):
u, p, ok := r.BasicAuth()
if !ok {
break
}
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(u), []byte(h.User)) == 1 &&
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(p), []byte(h.Password)) == 1 {
id = identity{Type: "service", Name: h.User, Level: "admin"}
} else if usr, ok := h.Store.VerifyUserPassword(u, p); ok {
id = identity{Type: "user", Name: usr.Username, Level: roleLevel(usr.Role), UserID: usr.ID}
_ = h.Store.TouchUserLogin(usr.ID)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(r.Header.Get("Authorization"), "Bearer "):
key := strings.TrimPrefix(r.Header.Get("Authorization"), "Bearer ")
if k, usr, ok := h.Store.LookupApiKey(store.HashApiKey(key)); ok {
id = identity{Type: "key", Name: k.Label, Level: k.Scope, UserID: usr.ID}
_ = h.Store.TouchApiKey(k.ID)
}
}
if id.Level == "" {
w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Basic realm="webui-frpc", Bearer realm="webui4frpc-apikey"`)
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"unauthorized"}`))
return
}
if levelRank(id.Level) < need {
forbidden(w)
return
}
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxKey{}, id)
next(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
}
}
}