ccquota asked one vendor one question. The shape that generalizes is two parts:
a small set of probe adapters, and a declarative override for a provider nobody
anticipated.
Three adapters, each verified against a LIVE endpoint rather than assumed:
- deepseek family: GET /user/balance →
{is_available, balance_infos:[{currency,total,granted,topped_up}]}.
Granted vs topped-up is kept separate on purpose: gift credit expiring on a
schedule is a different operational fact from prepaid money.
- OpenAI console shape: /v1/dashboard/billing/subscription +
.../billing/usage. This reports LIMITS and SPEND, not a balance — the live
provider has hard_limit_usd 1e8. There is deliberately no `remaining`:
ceiling - spend would read as "$99,999,339 left", a number nobody should
believe. It renders as spend against a ceiling instead.
- commandcode: rolling 5h / weekly / monthly windows plus billing period.
A provider with no working adapter is SKIPPED and listed by name at the bottom.
Most of these upstreams are small re-sells whose dashboard paths return an HTML
page rather than JSON; a table full of "unknown" rows teaches the operator to
ignore the page entirely. Failures that are NOT "no endpoint" — a 403 on a key we
hold — stay visible, because those are the ones worth fixing.
## Cost control, and a lock the probe runs under
First load measured 101s for 21 sources: 3 adapters x 2 attempts x 4s, times 21.
Call() holds the plugin's write lock for the whole invocation, so every
__llmsproxy_http round trip inside it blocks request_end hooks — which is how
billing accrues money. A slow upstream is not just a slow card.
- Timeout cut to 4s (from 10s).
- A host->adapter memo, persisted in plugin.state, so the dead ends are
discovered once per process instead of on every page open. Steady state is
22s.
- The memo records NEGATIVE results too, which is what actually paid: only
recording successes left every silent source re-probing forever.
- Negatives carry a timestamp and expire after 30 minutes. "This upstream has
no balance endpoint" is a fact that changes — vendors ship dashboards — and a
permanent negative makes the page quietly stop reporting a source that
started working.
- The page calls collect_source concurrently, one call per source, so a single
502 over 21 sequential probes becomes 21 independent answers.
## Two bugs the page found
- deepseek reports topped_up_balance -0.02 against a positive grant; the `v <= 0
→ "0.00"` branch flattened a real debit to zero. Negative balances now render
as -¥0.02.
- PLAN_CAPS was declared below the adapter that reads it, so Command Code hit
"attempt to index global 'PLAN_CAPS' (a nil value)" on every probe. A Lua local
is nil until its assignment runs.
Verified on production: 5 sources report, 16 skipped by name, 1 visible failure
(tabitoken 403). deepseek ¥0.32 (赠送 0.34 · 充值 -0.02), justwoker $360,865.71
spent against an ∞ ceiling, both Command Code seats with their three windows.
Co-Authored-By: ModelRouter <noreply@modelrouter.dev>
(cherry picked from commit 098a4a5eb4)
(cherry picked from commit 40636abcc2)
A quota plugin cannot work on billing's model. Billing reports what the gateway
already measured, delivered on hooks during request forwarding. A plan balance
has no such arrival path: it exists only on the vendor's side, and the only way
to learn it is to ask — at the moment the operator clicks Refresh. No hook fires
on a click, and pluginAPI offered only state read/write.
So this adds the missing piece: POST /api/plugins/{name}/call/{fn}, plus
pluginAPI.call on the page side.
## Why the gate is an explicit export list
That endpoint is an HTTP surface into a Lua state. Without a declared allowlist
it would let any caller invoke the plugin's private helpers with crafted
arguments and read whatever it can see — for a plugin holding an API key, that
is handing the key to anyone who can POST. So a function is callable only if the
plugin listed it in plugin.exports. A plugin with no exports has no callable
surface; reading the missing list as "allow all" is exactly the failure mode
worth designing against. The endpoint is also admin-only.
## ccquota
One account per configured source on api.commandcode.ai, keyed by that source's
own key — two keys on one host are two seats, and both are shown. Reads
/alpha/whoami, /alpha/billing/credits, /alpha/billing/subscriptions and
/alpha/usage/summary. Each endpoint degrades independently: a vendor retiring
one route must not blank the others, and a key out of quota still reads credits
fine while inference 401s, so the report records WHICH part failed rather than
rendering a zero that reads as "no quota left".
The 401-is-everything trap: those endpoints need a bearer token plus three
headers. The token lives in the table now, per request. Passing the shared
header table straight through — my first version — yields 401 on every
endpoint, which is indistinguishable from a revoked key and sent me auditing the
account instead of the plugin.
## Also fixed: three real defects found by going live
- The bridge was registered as `httpGlobal` (the Go const's IDENTIFIER) instead
of `__llmsproxy_http` (its VALUE). Green unit tests, "attempt to call global
'__llmsproxy_http' (a nil value)" on first real request. Now a test boots a
real plugin and calls it the way a plugin does.
- The call router kept `call/` in the function name, so every call 502'd with
`does not export "call/collect_account"` while the exports list looked fine.
- readPluginExports used luaToJSON, which needs the `json` global — not yet
installed while a plugin is registering — so it silently returned an empty
list and every export looked undeclared. It uses luaTableToGoValue now.
Two tests hardcoded counts ("1 bundled plugin", "4 pages") and turned red the
moment a second bundled plugin existed. They now assert what they mean: billing
is among the bundled plugins, and the pages this test contributed all merged in
order. A count assertion is a changelog detector.
## Verified on production
commandcode 2198972886@qq.com active $0.0811 5h 0/14 wk 0.803/35 44,921 req
commmandcode2 jianf3112@gmail.com active $0.0700 5h 0/14 wk 0/35 43,827 req
Co-Authored-By: ModelRouter <noreply@modelrouter.dev>
(cherry picked from commit 111dc6d53f)
(cherry picked from commit 22c9215b02)
Follow-on to the session-stability fix. "Per source" already made the
prefix cache hit, but it puts every conversation into one upstream session.
Using the client's own session id is not possible: capturing real agent
traffic (tcpdump on 127.0.0.1:8081) shows generic OpenAI clients send NO
session identifier at all — no user / session_id / conversation_id /
metadata in the body, and no session header (only X-Stainless-* plus
User-Agent: pi). The x-opencode-session the Go endpoint asks for is an
OpenCode native-client concept that a generic client cannot forward.
Since history is replayed every turn, the FIRST user message is invariant
for the life of a conversation, so it is used as the conversation
fingerprint. The session becomes stable within a conversation and distinct
across conversations; requests with no user message fall back to per-source
stability.
Measured through the gateway (same 5.7k-token prompt): 2nd call
cached_tokens=5504, and an unrelated conversation gets its own session.
Test: TestOpenCodeSessionIsStableForCache covers same-conversation
stability, cross-conversation separation, per-request request ids and the
sessionless fallback.
(cherry picked from commit 39b48e556e)
The opencode adapters derived x-opencode-session from meta.timestamp, i.e. a
brand new session on every request. The upstream prefix cache is
session-scoped, so no request could ever hit it, and the cache fields the
endpoint does report (prompt_tokens_details.cached_tokens,
prompt_cache_hit_tokens/prompt_cache_miss_tokens) always came back 0/absent.
Measured against the live endpoint, same 6032-token prompt:
fixed session id -> 2nd call: hit 5888, miss 144
rotating session id -> every call: hit 0, miss 6032
Fix: derive the session from the source name (stable), matching how
x-opencode-project is already derived. x-opencode-request stays unique per
request — it is only a request identifier, not part of the cache key.
Applied to both opencodego and opencodezen.
Through the gateway the same prompt now reports, on the 2nd call:
details={'cached_tokens': 5888} hit=5888 miss=144 (non-streaming)
prompt_tokens_details={'cached_tokens': 5888} (streaming)
Test: TestOpenCodeSessionIsStableForCache asserts the session is stable
across requests for one source while the request id differs.
(cherry picked from commit 791d198f47)
v1.5.4 stopped stripping reasoning_content, which fixes clients that send
it — but most agent clients (pi included) never store or replay their
reasoning, keeping only the tool call. OpenCode Go validates the field on
any assistant turn that carries tool_calls and rejects the whole request:
400 invalid_request_error: The `reasoning_content` in the thinking mode
must be passed back to the API.
Verified against the live endpoint that an EMPTY string satisfies the
check, so the adapter now fills in "" when a tool-calling assistant turn
has no reasoning_content. Nothing is fabricated: the reasoning shown to
the client is still exactly what the upstream returned for that turn.
Measured: with a tool_call + tool_result history and no reasoning_content,
all 25 configured Go models returned 400 before and all 25 answer
correctly now.
Test: TestOpenCodeGoVsZenReasoning also pins that a plain assistant turn
(no tool calls) must NOT gain the field.
(cherry picked from commit d1a72cd23a)
Zen (https://opencode.ai/zen/v1) and Go (https://opencode.ai/zen/go/v1)
are different services with different requirements, and one shared adapter
could not satisfy both.
The decisive difference is reasoning_content:
* OpenCode Go runs thinking models and REQUIRES the assistant turn's
reasoning_content to be echoed back. The shared adapter stripped it
(msg.reasoning_content = nil), so every replay of a thinking turn
failed with:
400 invalid_request_error: The `reasoning_content` in the thinking
mode must be passed back to the API.
Reproduced directly: the same request with reasoning_content -> 200,
without -> 400. That is why the Go tier never worked in an agent loop.
* The Zen free pool must not receive it, so it keeps stripping.
Both adapters keep the earlier fixes they share (never drop an assistant
turn carrying tool_calls; send stream_options only when streaming; role
whitelist; multimodal strip) and the opencode client fingerprint headers —
the Go endpoint additionally REQUIRES x-opencode-session, which the
adapter already sends.
config: localzen -> opencodezen, gozen -> opencodego.
Verified: all 25 gozen models answer correctly through the gateway with a
thinking + tool_call + tool_result history (was 0/25 before), streaming
included; the Zen free models still pass.
Test: TestOpenCodeGoVsZenReasoning pins the Go-keeps / Zen-strips split.
(cherry picked from commit 71e9040a45)
OpenCode Go (and other strict OpenAI-compatible upstreams) reject a
non-streaming request that carries stream_options with
"stream_options should be set along with stream". The adapter attached it
unconditionally, so every non-stream call through the opencode adapter
failed on those upstreams.
Verified against OpenCode Go: 25/25 configured models now pass a real
completion through the gateway (they previously 400'd).
Test: TestOpenCodeStreamOptionsOnlyWhenStreaming (absent when
non-streaming, include_usage present when streaming).
(cherry picked from commit 0528941e24)
Three related forwarding defects found by auditing every adapter with a
tool-calling replay (assistant turn with content:[] + tool_calls).
1) content:[] -> content:{} (all 12 openai-adapter sources, plus
deepseek/trae/sensenova/agentrouter/github/groq/kimicode/mistral)
Lua adapters json.decode the request and re-encode it, and an empty Lua
table is indistinguishable from an empty JSON array — the encoder emits
{} for both. Agent clients serialise a tool-calling assistant turn with
no text as content:[], so every pass-through adapter rewrote it to
content:{} — not valid OpenAI (content is string|array|null). Verified
against a live upstream: content:[] produced "400 invalid arguments"
while content:"" was accepted.
Fixed once at the decode boundary (types.ChatMessage.UnmarshalJSON):
empty-array content normalises to "" and an empty tool_calls array is
dropped, so every adapter — including future ones — sees a valid shape.
2) gemini dropped tool_calls and never emitted functionCall /
functionResponse; the tool role also stayed as an invalid role inside
contents and system was not moved to systemInstruction.
3) ollama copied only role/content, dropping tool_calls and the call
attribution entirely (it needs tool_name, not tool_call_id).
Test: TestAdaptersPreserveToolCalls asserts, for every adapter, that the
call id (or function name where the wire format has no id), the function
name, the tool result and the trailing user turn all survive, plus a
negative control for plain text.
(cherry picked from commit 9114468753)
An agent client (pi) serialises an assistant turn whose content is only
[thinking, toolCall] as content:[] with tool_calls. The multimodal-strip
pass treated an empty content array as 'nothing left, drop the whole
message' and discarded the tool_calls with it.
The next message is that call's tool result, so it arrived orphaned: the
model saw a result for a call it had never made and re-issued the same
call on every turn — an endless repeated-tool-call loop. Reproduced
against a capture sink: content:[] lost tool_calls, while content:"" and
content:null kept them.
Only messages with neither usable content NOR a tool call now get
dropped. Content that collapses to empty but still has tool_calls or a
tool_call_id is emitted as "" instead.
Test: TestOpenCodeKeepsToolCallWithEmptyContent (plus a negative control
that an image-only message without tool calls is still dropped).
(cherry picked from commit 499f0cac2f)
A key with scope=[AUTO] could previously:
1. request ANY concrete model id directly (hasScopeModel/checkModelScope
treated AUTO as a wildcard)
2. see the full 56-model list on /v1/models (intersectModels considered
AUTO as grant-everything)
AUTO now only authorizes the AUTO routing mode. Direct requests to a
specific model require an explicit scope entry.
Also carries agentrouter.lua WAF fingerprint headers (Origin/Referer/
X-Requested-With) already staged on this branch.
Tests: TestHasScopeModelWithSourcePrefix updated; full suite green.
(cherry picked from commit 7fb8f96b82)
Full-repo audit after the anthropic/openai fix: agentrouter exposes
claude-opus-4-8, so it inherits Anthropic's tool id rule
^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}$ and rejects the whole request on a violation, exactly
like justwoker/tabitoken/扇贝. It was the only remaining adapter serving Claude
models without the sanitizer, so a client that had picked up a dirty id (e.g.
"bash:0" from moonshotai/kimi-k3) would still lose every turn here.
Same shape as the other two — inbound tool_calls[].id + tool_call_id, outbound
non-streaming ids and the first streamed fragment — and the test now asserts
all three adapters rewrite an identical input identically, so a client mixing
sources within one session cannot end up with unpaired tool calls.
Audit result: every source exposing a claude/opus/sonnet model (qijiar, toter,
juziai, agentrouter, justwoker, api456, tabitoken) now routes through a
sanitizing adapter.
Anthropic and OpenAI disagree on what the prompt count means:
Anthropic: input_tokens EXCLUDES cached blocks; cache_read_input_tokens and
cache_creation_input_tokens are separate, additive, billed input.
OpenAI: prompt_tokens INCLUDES its cached_tokens subset.
anthropic.lua mapped input_tokens straight onto prompt, so a cache-heavy turn
was doubly wrong: the billed prompt was undercounted by the entire cache
portion, and cached_tokens could exceed prompt_tokens — a cache hit rate above
100% for any client that divides one by the other. cache_creation_input_tokens
was never read at all, so a cache-write turn silently lost those billed tokens.
Worse, the streaming path dropped the cache split entirely: message_delta
carries the FINAL usage and only mapped input/output, so every streamed
response reported no cache information even when the upstream sent it.
All three counts are now summed into prompt, with the read half exposed as
prompt_tokens_details.cached_tokens plus the DeepSeek-legacy hit/miss pair, via
one shared map_usage() used by transform_response, message_start and
message_delta. A reported zero stays distinguishable from "never reported": the
split is emitted whenever either cache field is present, and omitted entirely
when the upstream mentions neither (justwoker reports only input/output plus its
own cost fields, so its output is byte-identical to before). map_usage returns
nil for a countless object, preserving "no usage in this chunk means say
nothing" rather than reporting zeros.
message_start's placeholder count is still emitted: justwoker reports 160 there
and the real 6931 in message_delta, and the gateway's mergeUsage lets the later
non-zero value win.
Anthropic requires tool_use.id / tool_result.tool_use_id to match
^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}$ and rejects the WHOLE request otherwise with
REQUEST_BODY_INVALID / "Invalid tool use format". OpenAI has no such rule, so
an OpenAI-compatible model can mint an id like "bash:0"
(xinjianya/moonshotai/kimi-k3 does exactly that).
In a fan-out router that id does not stay local: the client stores it in its
history and replays it to every other source. One such id therefore kills
every Claude slot at once — justwoker, tabitoken and 扇贝 are all
Claude-behind-{OpenAI,Anthropic} — and an AUTO request falls through all four
tiers to whatever tolerant model is left. Observed live: 4 consecutive 503
"all N auto providers failed" with tier 1/2/3 each reporting the same 400.
Both directions are sanitized, in both adapters:
- request: tool_calls[].id and tool_call_id, so poisoned history recovers
- response: non-streaming tool_calls[].id and the first streamed fragment,
so a bad id never enters a client session in the first place
safe_tool_id is pure and deterministic, so a call and its result are rewritten
identically within one request. A rewritten id keeps an 8-hex digest of the
original, without which distinct ids could collapse ("a:b" and "a_b") into a
duplicate/unpaired tool_use. Already-legal ids pass through byte-identical, so
well-behaved traffic is unaffected. openai.lua carries its own copy because
Lua adapters have no shared prelude.
Streamed argument fragments carry no id and must stay id-less, otherwise
index-based accumulation on the client breaks; a test pins that.
Root cause: trae-local-api is deployed to users without the "Fold past
assistant tool_calls into [Called tool: name({...})]" text format that
their own histories already contained. Trae-Local-API-LLM then mimics this
format in subsequent responses. The trae.lua parser only recognized
<tool_call>...</tool_call> or <toolcall>...</toolcall> tags, so
[Called tool: ...] responses were left unparsed and the client received
plain text where a structured tool_calls array should be.
Fix: Add a legacy pattern match at the END of parse_text_tool_calls to
catch the [Called tool: name({args})] shape and emit proper tool_calls.
This is a fallback; models should emit <tool_call> tags per system prompt,
but we tolerate the mimicked form for robustness.
Four adapters handled tool_calls in transform_stream_chunk but lost them in
transform_response, so any NON-streaming tool-using conversation broke on its
second request: the client received finish_reason:"tool_calls" with no
tool_calls payload, replayed an assistant message whose function
name/arguments were empty, and the upstream rejected the next turn with
400 invalid tool_call function, function/name/arguments cannot be empty
The production audit trail shows 46 such failures on sensenova alone.
- sensenova.lua: forward message.tool_calls, decoding the arguments JSON string
into an object as the unified shape expects.
- gemini.lua: collect functionCall parts from candidates[].content.parts. Also
correct finish_reason, since Gemini reports "STOP" even when it emitted a
function call and clients keyed on it treat that as a finished answer.
- ollama.lua: the field was initialized to an empty table and never filled;
fill it and likewise correct done_reason "stop" -> "tool_calls".
trae is a different failure with the same symptom: trae-local-api's OpenAI
endpoint (/v1/chat/completions, src/server.js:353) never reads the request's
`tools` array — only its Anthropic endpoint does — so the relayed model is never
told the tool schema and instead PRINTS a <tool_call>{...}</tool_call> block into
content, leaving message.tool_calls null and finish_reason "stop". An OpenAI
client sees an ordinary completion and its agent loop ends mid-conversation.
trae.lua now recovers the structured call from that text, strips the block from
user-visible content, and corrects finish_reason. Both tag spellings
(<tool_call>/<toolcall>, the latter is what the same codebase's Anthropic prompt
asks for) and all three argument key names (arguments/params/input) are accepted.
This is a defensive fallback: fixing the upstream shim to honour `tools` remains
the real fix, since the model still guesses parameter names.
Tests: TestNonStreamToolCallsPreserved covers all ten OpenAI-shaped adapters,
TestGeminiNonStreamToolCalls and TestOllamaNonStreamToolCalls cover their native
shapes, TestTraeTextToolCallRecovery covers both tag spellings, prose around the
block, and asserts a plain text answer never gains tool_calls.
Verified end-to-end against mock upstreams reproducing each shape: a full
two-round agent loop (tool call -> tool result -> final answer) now completes for
both the structured and the text-emitted variants.
