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Author SHA1 Message Date
6733534282 chore(version): 1.5.2 2026-09-10 19:45:31 +08:00
499f0cac2f fix(opencode): never drop an assistant turn that carries tool_calls
An agent client (pi) serialises an assistant turn whose content is only
[thinking, toolCall] as content:[] with tool_calls. The multimodal-strip
pass treated an empty content array as 'nothing left, drop the whole
message' and discarded the tool_calls with it.

The next message is that call's tool result, so it arrived orphaned: the
model saw a result for a call it had never made and re-issued the same
call on every turn — an endless repeated-tool-call loop. Reproduced
against a capture sink: content:[] lost tool_calls, while content:"" and
content:null kept them.

Only messages with neither usable content NOR a tool call now get
dropped. Content that collapses to empty but still has tool_calls or a
tool_call_id is emitted as "" instead.

Test: TestOpenCodeKeepsToolCallWithEmptyContent (plus a negative control
that an image-only message without tool calls is still dropped).
2026-09-10 19:32:47 +08:00
7fb8f96b82 fix(gateway): AUTO scope grants all models — restrict to routing mode only
A key with scope=[AUTO] could previously:
1. request ANY concrete model id directly (hasScopeModel/checkModelScope
   treated AUTO as a wildcard)
2. see the full 56-model list on /v1/models (intersectModels considered
   AUTO as grant-everything)

AUTO now only authorizes the AUTO routing mode. Direct requests to a
specific model require an explicit scope entry.

Also carries agentrouter.lua WAF fingerprint headers (Origin/Referer/
X-Requested-With) already staged on this branch.

Tests: TestHasScopeModelWithSourcePrefix updated; full suite green.
2026-09-10 12:51:40 +08:00
6a34cd6f86 chore(version): 1.4.2 -> 1.5.0 2026-09-06 10:17:43 +08:00
f0986751de Merge feature/agentrouter-id-sanitize: 补上最后一个服务 Claude 的适配器
全仓审计发现 agentrouter 也暴露 claude-opus-4-8,却是唯一没有 id 消毒的
Claude 适配器。补齐后,所有含 claude/opus/sonnet 模型的源(qijiar、toter、
juziai、agentrouter、justwoker、api456、tabitoken)全部走消毒路径;
测试新增三适配器结果一致性断言。
2026-09-06 10:08:52 +08:00
c6c3e0dcd7 fix(agentrouter): sanitize tool-call ids — it fronts Claude too
Full-repo audit after the anthropic/openai fix: agentrouter exposes
claude-opus-4-8, so it inherits Anthropic's tool id rule
^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}$ and rejects the whole request on a violation, exactly
like justwoker/tabitoken/扇贝. It was the only remaining adapter serving Claude
models without the sanitizer, so a client that had picked up a dirty id (e.g.
"bash:0" from moonshotai/kimi-k3) would still lose every turn here.

Same shape as the other two — inbound tool_calls[].id + tool_call_id, outbound
non-streaming ids and the first streamed fragment — and the test now asserts
all three adapters rewrite an identical input identically, so a client mixing
sources within one session cannot end up with unpaired tool calls.

Audit result: every source exposing a claude/opus/sonnet model (qijiar, toter,
juziai, agentrouter, justwoker, api456, tabitoken) now routes through a
sanitizing adapter.
2026-09-06 10:08:52 +08:00
b9944332ff Merge feature/anthropic-usage-cache: 缓存命中不该让 prompt_tokens 算错
Anthropic 的 input_tokens 不含缓存部分,OpenAI 的 prompt_tokens 含。
直接对映射等于漏算全部缓存 token,还能算出 >100% 的命中率;
cache_creation 完全没读;流式路径连缓存字段都整个丢掉。
三项相加 + 共享 map_usage,未上报缓存的上游输出逐字节不变。
2026-09-06 09:55:22 +08:00
6bdb9fcc44 fix(anthropic): count cached input in prompt_tokens instead of dropping it
Anthropic and OpenAI disagree on what the prompt count means:

  Anthropic: input_tokens EXCLUDES cached blocks; cache_read_input_tokens and
             cache_creation_input_tokens are separate, additive, billed input.
  OpenAI:    prompt_tokens INCLUDES its cached_tokens subset.

anthropic.lua mapped input_tokens straight onto prompt, so a cache-heavy turn
was doubly wrong: the billed prompt was undercounted by the entire cache
portion, and cached_tokens could exceed prompt_tokens — a cache hit rate above
100% for any client that divides one by the other. cache_creation_input_tokens
was never read at all, so a cache-write turn silently lost those billed tokens.

Worse, the streaming path dropped the cache split entirely: message_delta
carries the FINAL usage and only mapped input/output, so every streamed
response reported no cache information even when the upstream sent it.

All three counts are now summed into prompt, with the read half exposed as
prompt_tokens_details.cached_tokens plus the DeepSeek-legacy hit/miss pair, via
one shared map_usage() used by transform_response, message_start and
message_delta. A reported zero stays distinguishable from "never reported": the
split is emitted whenever either cache field is present, and omitted entirely
when the upstream mentions neither (justwoker reports only input/output plus its
own cost fields, so its output is byte-identical to before). map_usage returns
nil for a countless object, preserving "no usage in this chunk means say
nothing" rather than reporting zeros.

message_start's placeholder count is still emitted: justwoker reports 160 there
and the real 6931 in message_delta, and the gateway's mergeUsage lets the later
non-zero value win.
2026-09-06 09:55:22 +08:00
25eb30c15b Merge feature/toolcall-id-sanitize: 一个上游的脏 tool_call id 不该拖垮整条 Claude 链
xinjianya/moonshotai/kimi-k3 会吐出 'bash:0' 这种 id。OpenAI 不校验,
Anthropic 校验 ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}$ 且整条请求直接 400。客户端会把它存进
历史并回放给所有源,于是 justwoker / tabitoken / 扇贝(都是 Claude 上游)
同时挂掉,AUTO 一路穿透四个 tier。

两个适配器、进出双向消毒;已合法的 id 逐字节透传;流式参数分片保持无 id。
2026-09-05 22:19:15 +08:00
131a42a169 fix(adapters): sanitize tool-call ids so one bad upstream can't kill every Claude slot
Anthropic requires tool_use.id / tool_result.tool_use_id to match
^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}$ and rejects the WHOLE request otherwise with
REQUEST_BODY_INVALID / "Invalid tool use format". OpenAI has no such rule, so
an OpenAI-compatible model can mint an id like "bash:0"
(xinjianya/moonshotai/kimi-k3 does exactly that).

In a fan-out router that id does not stay local: the client stores it in its
history and replays it to every other source. One such id therefore kills
every Claude slot at once — justwoker, tabitoken and 扇贝 are all
Claude-behind-{OpenAI,Anthropic} — and an AUTO request falls through all four
tiers to whatever tolerant model is left. Observed live: 4 consecutive 503
"all N auto providers failed" with tier 1/2/3 each reporting the same 400.

Both directions are sanitized, in both adapters:
  - request:  tool_calls[].id and tool_call_id, so poisoned history recovers
  - response: non-streaming tool_calls[].id and the first streamed fragment,
              so a bad id never enters a client session in the first place

safe_tool_id is pure and deterministic, so a call and its result are rewritten
identically within one request. A rewritten id keeps an 8-hex digest of the
original, without which distinct ids could collapse ("a:b" and "a_b") into a
duplicate/unpaired tool_use. Already-legal ids pass through byte-identical, so
well-behaved traffic is unaffected. openai.lua carries its own copy because
Lua adapters have no shared prelude.

Streamed argument fragments carry no id and must stay id-less, otherwise
index-based accumulation on the client breaks; a test pins that.
2026-09-05 22:18:31 +08:00
3cdb16c906 Merge feature/deploy-config-rollback: 部署脚本把配置纳入回滚闭环
上一轮 446 次重启循环的根因不是代码,是 deploy.sh 把 config.yaml 当作
部署范围之外的东西:健康检查失败后只回滚二进制,坏配置仍在,于是旧
二进制照样解析不了,服务在 systemd 重启循环里空转。

修法是把配置变成一等部署对象:--config 投放 + 重启前 -check 预检 +
回滚时二进制与配置一起恢复。预检位置比预检本身更重要——排在 restart
之前,坏配置才会在服务仍健康时被拦下。
2026-09-05 09:47:04 +08:00
ef92ce4d82 Merge feature/source-proxy: 让被 CF/格式问题挡住的源真正可用
两件事都在回答同一个问题——为什么配了源却用不了:

- trae 源在流式下把模型打印的 tool_call 当纯文本透传,客户端收到
  finish_reason "stop" + 一段文本,agent 循环当场终止
- justwoker/tabitoken 坐在 Cloudflare 后面,直连 403,必须走代理 +
  浏览器 UA;但全局 env 代理会把 trae/localzen 等内网源也绕出去

因此引入 per-source proxy_url:指定的源走专属代理,未指定的保持直连。
2026-09-05 09:46:54 +08:00
c524831616 fix(deploy): roll back config together with the binary, and preflight it before restart
The 446-restart-loop incident: adding a headers block to a source without
removing the source's existing `headers: {}` produced a duplicate YAML key.
The process exited on startup, healthcheck failed, and rollback restored only
the binary — so the old binary kept parsing the same broken config and the
service span in systemd's restart loop. Config was treated as out of scope
for deployment; it is not.

Three changes close the loop:

1. cmd/llmsproxy: new `-check` flag validates a config (parse +
   ApplyDefaults) and exits, without starting the Lua VM, touching
   runtime.json, or binding a port — safe to run against a live service.
   Unlike normal startup it does NOT create a default config, so a missing
   file is an error.

2. deploy.sh `--config <file>`: stage a config for deployment, atomically
   renamed into place with the same copy->rename(2) technique as the binary.
   Omitted means the live config is left alone.

3. Ordering: config replacement and preflight both run BEFORE
   restart_service, so an invalid config is caught while the service is still
   healthy and never triggers a restart. rollback() now restores binary AND
   config (only when this run replaced it, so concurrent WebUI edits survive),
   then re-runs -check before restarting — refusing to restart into a config
   that still fails, instead of trading one restart storm for another.

Also: the sha256-unchanged early exit now only fires when there is no pending
config, otherwise `--config` would be silently dropped.

Verified on the live deployment:
- reproduced the exact duplicate-key config: preflight caught it, PID
  unchanged (zero interruption), binary and config both rolled back, gateway
  still answering 200
- valid config: replaced, service restarted, new value live
- no --config: binary-only deploy unaffected
- go test -tags luajit ./... passes
2026-09-05 09:46:43 +08:00
868ac59692 feat(provider): support per-source proxy_url for geo-blocked upstreams
Upstreams like justwoker/tabitoken sit behind Cloudflare geo/IP blocks and
only respond through a proxy. A global env proxy is wrong (intranet sources
trae/localzen must stay direct), so add an explicit per-source proxy_url
that overrides http.ProxyFromEnvironment for just that source. Sources
without proxy_url keep the existing env/direct behavior.

Also accepts a User-Agent header per source (config already supported
headers) so CF-fronted resellers can be reached.

Verified e2e: tabitoken and justwoker now return tool_calls through
127.0.0.1:7890 (clash); trae stays direct. Full go test -tags luajit
passes.
2026-09-05 09:46:36 +08:00
4d197e4bd3 fix(trae): recover legacy [Called tool:...] tool call format
Root cause: trae-local-api is deployed to users without the "Fold past
assistant tool_calls into [Called tool: name({...})]" text format that
their own histories already contained. Trae-Local-API-LLM then mimics this
format in subsequent responses. The trae.lua parser only recognized
<tool_call>...</tool_call> or <toolcall>...</toolcall> tags, so
[Called tool: ...] responses were left unparsed and the client received
plain text where a structured tool_calls array should be.

Fix: Add a legacy pattern match at the END of parse_text_tool_calls to
catch the [Called tool: name({args})] shape and emit proper tool_calls.
This is a fallback; models should emit <tool_call> tags per system prompt,
but we tolerate the mimicked form for robustness.
2026-09-05 09:46:36 +08:00
3806aaee03 docs(workflow): codify the branch model — main / feature / release branches
Adopt GitHub Flow + release branches, replacing "everything straight to main
plus a tag" which caused the 1.4.2 pain (a fix had to be retro-fitted to the
released version, forcing a remote-tag delete + full re-upload).

- main: only long-lived branch, always deployable, accumulates the next version
- feature/<desc>: born from main, merged back when done
- release/vX.Y.Z: cut from main, tagged, installers built from the tag
- hotfixes land on the release branch AND are cherry-picked back to main so
  main never loses a fix
- end of lifecycle = retire the release branch (delete; or keep for long-term
  maintenance), no wholesale merge back — hotfixes already flowed
- explicitly no rebase of main, no release-branch-merge, no quick edits on main

Companion release checklist includes the upload lessons (PUT --http1.1) and the
replace-artifacts-by-deleting-the-tag catch.

Docs in docs/git-workflow.md (zh) and docs/git-workflow-en.md, linked from both
READMEs.
2026-08-31 12:36:17 +08:00
18 changed files with 1250 additions and 110 deletions

View File

@ -490,6 +490,15 @@ internal/gateway # OpenAI 兼容 HTTP 服务 + 鉴权 + SDK/流式 + Web
internal/types # 统一格式 & OpenAI wire 类型
```
## 开发协作
- **Git 分支工作流**:主分支 / 特性分支 / 发布分支的规范见
**[docs/git-workflow.md](docs/git-workflow.md)**([English](docs/git-workflow-en.md))。
主线:`main` 永可部署 → 特性合入 `main` → 切 `release/vX.Y.Z` 打 tag 发布 →
hotfix 提交发布分支并 cherry-pick 回 `main`。
- **Lua 适配器协议**:见 **[docs/lua-adapters.md](docs/lua-adapters.md)**
([English](docs/lua-adapters-en.md))。
## 测试
```bash

View File

@ -507,6 +507,17 @@ internal/gateway # OpenAI-compatible HTTP + auth + SDK/streaming + WebUI
internal/types # unified format & OpenAI wire types
```
## Development & collaboration
- **Git branching workflow**: main / feature / release-branch conventions in
**[docs/git-workflow-en.md](docs/git-workflow-en.md)**
([中文](docs/git-workflow.md)). The line: `main` is always deployable →
features merge into `main` → cut `release/vX.Y.Z` and tag → release → hotfixes
land on the release branch and are cherry-picked back into `main`.
- **Lua adapter protocol**: see
**[docs/lua-adapters-en.md](docs/lua-adapters-en.md)**
([中文](docs/lua-adapters.md)).
## Tests
```bash

View File

@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
{
"name": "modelrouter-gui",
"version": "1.4.2",
"version": "1.5.2",
"lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "modelrouter-gui",
"version": "1.4.2",
"version": "1.5.2",
"license": "Proprietary",
"devDependencies": {
"electron": "^33.0.0",

View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "modelrouter-gui",
"version": "1.4.2",
"version": "1.5.2",
"description": "ModelRouter Desktop — embedded ModelRouter core with tray",
"author": "ModelRouter",
"main": "main.js",

View File

@ -23,8 +23,24 @@ import (
func main() {
cfgPath := flag.String("config", "config.yaml", "path to gateway config file")
checkOnly := flag.Bool("check", false, "validate the config file and exit (0 = valid, 1 = invalid); nothing is started and no file is written")
flag.Parse()
// -check is the deploy-time preflight: parse and validate the config
// without starting the Lua VM, touching runtime.json, or binding a port.
// It deliberately does NOT call EnsureDefault, so a missing file is an
// error here instead of being silently created.
if *checkOnly {
if _, err := os.Stat(*cfgPath); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("[llmsproxy] check: %v", err)
}
if _, err := config.Load(*cfgPath); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("[llmsproxy] check: %v", err)
}
log.Printf("[llmsproxy] check: %s is valid", *cfgPath)
return
}
created, err := config.EnsureDefault(*cfgPath)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("[llmsproxy] config: %v", err)

173
deploy.sh
View File

@ -10,6 +10,16 @@
# 4. systemctl restart → 服务中断仅在 Go 进程重启瞬间 (<500ms)
# 5. 健康检查确认新进程正常
#
# 配置文件(2026-09-05 起):
# 本脚本不再假设 config.yaml 与部署无关。实测教训:给源加 headers 时
# 漏删原有的 `headers: {}` → YAML 重复键 → 进程启动即退出 → 健康检查
# 失败 → 旧的 rollback 只恢复二进制,配置错误仍在,于是旧二进制也起不来,
# 服务陷入 systemd 重启循环(当时累计 446 次)。
# 因此:
# - 支持 --config <file> 投放一份待部署配置(原子 rename 到 TARGET_CONFIG)
# - 重启前先用新二进制 `-check` 预检配置,不合法就地失败,绝不重启服务
# - rollback 同时恢复二进制与配置文件,回滚后再次 -check 才重启
#
# 注意事项:
# - 本服务依赖自身(推理依赖),restart 前后会短暂中断,
# 但重试机制(systemd RestartSec=5 + 客户端 retry)可自愈
@ -19,6 +29,7 @@ set -euo pipefail
# ---------- 配置 ----------
readonly TARGET_BIN="/usr/local/bin/llmsproxy"
readonly TARGET_CONFIG="/etc/llmsproxy/config.yaml"
readonly TARGET_ADAPTERS="/etc/llmsproxy/adapters"
readonly REPO_DIR="/home/program/llmsproxy"
readonly HEALTH_URL="http://127.0.0.1:8081/v1/models"
@ -28,8 +39,40 @@ readonly BIN_NAME="llmsproxy"
readonly TMP_DIR="/tmp/llmsproxy-deploy"
# 同文件系统暂存文件(用于原子 rename)
readonly STAGING_BIN="${TARGET_BIN}.staging"
# 回滚备份:健康检查失败时从这里恢复旧二进制
readonly STAGING_CONFIG="${TARGET_CONFIG}.staging"
# 回滚备份:健康检查失败时从这里恢复旧二进制 / 旧配置
readonly BACKUP_BIN="${TARGET_BIN}.bak"
readonly BACKUP_CONFIG="${TARGET_CONFIG}.rollback.bak"
# 待部署配置(--config <file> 指定;为空 = 不改动线上配置)
NEW_CONFIG_SRC=""
usage() {
cat <<'EOF'
用法: ./deploy.sh [--config <file>]
--config <file> 投放这份配置到 /etc/llmsproxy/config.yaml(原子替换)。
省略时不改动线上配置,只部署二进制与适配器。
无论是否指定,重启前都会用新二进制 -check 预检线上配置。
流程: 构建 → 适配器同步 → 备份(二进制+配置) → 原子替换 → 配置预检
→ 重启 → 健康检查 → 失败则回滚(二进制+配置)并重启
EOF
}
parse_args() {
while (( $# > 0 )); do
case "$1" in
--config)
[[ $# -ge 2 ]] || { echo "--config 需要一个文件参数" >&2; exit 2; }
NEW_CONFIG_SRC="$2"
shift 2
;;
-h|--help) usage; exit 0 ;;
*) echo "未知参数: $1" >&2; usage; exit 2 ;;
esac
done
}
# ---------- 日志 ----------
log() { printf '\033[1;34m[%s]\033[0m %s\n' "$(date +%H:%M:%S)" "$*"; }
@ -40,7 +83,7 @@ fail() { err "$@"; exit 1; }
# ---------- 清理 ----------
cleanup() {
log "清理临时文件"
rm -rf "$TMP_DIR" "$STAGING_BIN"
rm -rf "$TMP_DIR" "$STAGING_BIN" "$STAGING_CONFIG"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
@ -52,6 +95,18 @@ precheck() {
command -v systemctl &>/dev/null || fail "未找到 systemctl"
[[ $(id -u) -eq 0 ]] || fail "需要 root 权限"
if [[ -n "$NEW_CONFIG_SRC" ]]; then
[[ -f "$NEW_CONFIG_SRC" ]] || fail "待部署配置不存在: $NEW_CONFIG_SRC"
# 同一文件比对:--config 指向线上文件本身时没有"投放"动作可做,
# 但仍然会走重启前的 -check 预检。
if [[ "$(readlink -f "$NEW_CONFIG_SRC")" == "$(readlink -f "$TARGET_CONFIG" 2>/dev/null)" ]]; then
warn "--config 指向线上配置本身,跳过投放(仍会预检)"
NEW_CONFIG_SRC=""
else
log "待部署配置: $NEW_CONFIG_SRC → $TARGET_CONFIG"
fi
fi
OLD_SIZE=$(stat -c%s "$TARGET_BIN" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
OLD_SHA256=$(sha256sum "$TARGET_BIN" 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $1}')
@ -59,8 +114,10 @@ precheck() {
log "go: $(go version)"
}
# ---------- 备份旧二进制(用于回滚)----------
backup_old_binary() {
# ---------- 备份旧二进制 + 旧配置(用于回滚)----------
# 配置也必须备份:启动失败常常是配置问题,只回滚二进制会让旧二进制
# 继续吃坏配置,服务照样起不来。
backup_old_state() {
log "备份旧二进制到 $BACKUP_BIN"
if [[ -f "$TARGET_BIN" ]]; then
cp -f "$TARGET_BIN" "$BACKUP_BIN"
@ -68,6 +125,13 @@ backup_old_binary() {
else
warn "旧二进制不存在,跳过备份(无回滚点)"
fi
if [[ -f "$TARGET_CONFIG" ]]; then
cp -f "$TARGET_CONFIG" "$BACKUP_CONFIG"
log "✓ 旧配置已备份到 $BACKUP_CONFIG (sha256=$(sha256sum "$BACKUP_CONFIG" | awk '{print $1}' | cut -c1-16))"
else
warn "线上配置不存在: $TARGET_CONFIG(首次部署?无配置回滚点)"
fi
}
# ---------- 构建 ----------
@ -89,8 +153,13 @@ build() {
if [[ "$NEW_SIZE" -eq "$OLD_SIZE" ]]; then
NEW_SHA256=$(sha256sum "$NEW_BIN" | awk '{print $1}')
if [[ "$NEW_SHA256" == "$OLD_SHA256" ]]; then
warn "新二进制与旧版本完全一致(sha256 相同),跳过部署"
exit 0
# 二进制无变化。只有在同时也没有待部署配置时才能直接退出;
# 否则会造成“--config 指定了新配置却被静默丢弃”。
if [[ -z "$NEW_CONFIG_SRC" ]]; then
warn "新二进制与旧版本完全一致(sha256 相同)且无待部署配置,跳过部署"
exit 0
fi
log "二进制无变化(sha256 相同),但有待部署配置,继续"
fi
fi
@ -140,6 +209,41 @@ atomic_replace_binary() {
log "✓ 二进制已原子替换 (sha256=${NEW_SHA256:0:16})"
}
# ---------- 原子替换配置 ----------
# 与二进制同一套 copy→rename 手法:先落到 /etc 上的 .staging,再 rename(2)。
# 只有 --config 指定了来源时才动线上配置。
atomic_replace_config() {
[[ -n "$NEW_CONFIG_SRC" ]] || return 0
log "原子替换配置"
log " copy → $STAGING_CONFIG (同文件系统暂存)"
cp -f "$NEW_CONFIG_SRC" "$STAGING_CONFIG"
chmod 0644 "$STAGING_CONFIG"
log " rename → $TARGET_CONFIG (原子)"
mv -f "$STAGING_CONFIG" "$TARGET_CONFIG"
log "✓ 配置已原子替换 (sha256=$(sha256sum "$TARGET_CONFIG" | awk '{print $1}' | cut -c1-16))"
}
# ---------- 配置预检 ----------
# 用刚部署的新二进制解析线上配置。`-check` 只做 parse + ApplyDefaults,
# 不启动 Lua VM、不碰 runtime.json、不绑端口,因此可以安全地在服务仍在
# 运行时执行。不合法就在重启前失败——这正是上次事故缺的那一步。
verify_config() {
log "配置预检(新二进制 -check)"
[[ -f "$TARGET_CONFIG" ]] || fail "线上配置不存在: $TARGET_CONFIG"
local out
if out=$("$TARGET_BIN" -check -config "$TARGET_CONFIG" 2>&1); then
log "✓ 配置合法"
return 0
fi
err "配置预检失败,未重启服务(线上进程仍在跑旧配置):"
printf '%s\n' "$out" >&2
return 1
}
# ---------- 同步适配器 ----------
sync_adapters() {
log "同步适配器"
@ -206,20 +310,49 @@ healthcheck() {
}
# ---------- 回滚 ----------
# 健康检查失败时恢复旧二进制并重启,保证推理服务可用。
# 健康检查失败时恢复旧二进制**和旧配置**并重启,保证推理服务可用。
# 这是最后一道保险:即使新版本启动失败(编译错误、配置不兼容、
# panic on start 等),也能让旧版本继续服务,避免推理能力丢失。
#
# 为什么必须一并回滚配置:启动失败最常见的原因就是配置本身不合法
# (实测:YAML 重复键)。只恢复二进制的话,旧二进制照样解析不了坏配置,
# 服务继续在 systemd 重启循环里空转。
rollback() {
err "健康检查失败,启动回滚流程"
if [[ ! -f "$BACKUP_BIN" ]]; then
err "无回滚备份 ($BACKUP_BIN 不存在),无法自动恢复"
local restored_any=0
if [[ -f "$BACKUP_BIN" ]]; then
log "恢复旧二进制"
cp -f "$BACKUP_BIN" "$TARGET_BIN"
chmod 0755 "$TARGET_BIN"
restored_any=1
else
err "无二进制回滚备份 ($BACKUP_BIN 不存在)"
fi
# 只在本次真的换过配置时才回滚配置,避免把用户在部署期间
# 通过 WebUI 做的合法改动一起抹掉。
if [[ -n "$NEW_CONFIG_SRC" && -f "$BACKUP_CONFIG" ]]; then
log "恢复旧配置"
cp -f "$BACKUP_CONFIG" "$TARGET_CONFIG"
chmod 0644 "$TARGET_CONFIG"
restored_any=1
fi
if (( restored_any == 0 )); then
err "无任何回滚点,无法自动恢复"
err "请手动检查: systemctl status llmsproxy.service && journalctl -u llmsproxy -n 50"
return 1
fi
log "恢复旧二进制"
cp -f "$BACKUP_BIN" "$TARGET_BIN"
chmod 0755 "$TARGET_BIN"
# 回滚后先验证恢复出来的组合真的能解析,再重启——否则只是把
# 重启循环换个二进制继续跑。
if ! "$TARGET_BIN" -check -config "$TARGET_CONFIG" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
err "回滚后的配置仍不合法,拒绝重启(避免 systemd 重启风暴)"
err " 手动修复 $TARGET_CONFIG 后执行: $TARGET_BIN -check -config $TARGET_CONFIG"
err " 备份可用: 二进制=$BACKUP_BIN 配置=$BACKUP_CONFIG"
return 1
fi
log "重启服务(旧版本)"
systemctl restart llmsproxy.service || {
@ -248,18 +381,32 @@ print_summary() {
log "═════════════════════════════════════════════"
log "部署完成"
log " 二进制: $TARGET_BIN"
log " 配置: $TARGET_CONFIG$([[ -n "$NEW_CONFIG_SRC" ]] && echo " (本次已替换)" || echo " (未改动)")"
log " 适配器: $TARGET_ADAPTERS"
log "═════════════════════════════════════════════"
}
# ---------- 主流程 ----------
# 顺序要点:配置投放与预检都排在 restart_service **之前**,
# 于是坏配置在服务仍然健康时就被拦下,根本不会触发重启。
main() {
parse_args "$@"
log "═══ llmsproxy 原子部署开始 ═══"
precheck
build
sync_adapters
backup_old_binary
backup_old_state
atomic_replace_binary
atomic_replace_config
if ! verify_config; then
# 配置不合法:服务还没重启,只需把二进制/配置退回原状。
err "配置预检失败,回退本次改动(服务未受影响)"
[[ -f "$BACKUP_BIN" ]] && cp -f "$BACKUP_BIN" "$TARGET_BIN" && chmod 0755 "$TARGET_BIN"
if [[ -n "$NEW_CONFIG_SRC" && -f "$BACKUP_CONFIG" ]]; then
cp -f "$BACKUP_CONFIG" "$TARGET_CONFIG" && chmod 0644 "$TARGET_CONFIG"
fi
exit 1
fi
restart_service
if ! healthcheck; then
rollback || true

141
docs/git-workflow-en.md Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
# Git Branching Workflow
ModelRouter uses a **GitHub Flow + release-branch** model: `main` is the only
long-lived branch and is always deployable; new work branches off it as a
feature branch; each version gets its own release branch with a tag; hotfixes
land on the release branch and MUST flow back to `main`.
Goal: make "patching an already-released version during its support window" a
first-class operation, while `main` always contains every fix and stays
deployable.
## Branch roles
| Branch | Name | Lifetime | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| Main | `main` | permanent | Only long-lived branch. Always deployable. Accumulates the next version. |
| Feature | `feature/<desc>` | short (dev → merge → delete) | New features / ordinary fixes. Born from `main`, merged back into `main`. |
| Release | `release/vX.Y.Z` | one version cycle | Cut from `main`, tagged for release. Version-specific hotfixes land here. |
## Change flow (important)
```
feature/foo ───────┐
▼
main ──────────────── next version ──────►
│ │
│ cut │ cut
▼ ▼
release/v1.4.2 release/v1.4.3
│ │
tag: v1.4.2 tag: v1.4.3
│ │
hotfix ◄─────┘ hotfix ◄─────┘
│ │
└── cherry-pick back ──────────┘
```
### Key rules
1. **main is always deployable**: never leave half-done work on `main`.
Unfinished work lives on a feature branch.
2. **Features start from main and merge back**: `git checkout -b feature/xxx main`,
then `git merge --no-ff feature/xxx` (or squash) when done.
3. **Release = cut a release branch from main + tag**:
```bash
git checkout -b release/v1.4.2 main
git tag -a v1.4.2 -m "ModelRouter v1.4.2"
git push origin release/v1.4.2 v1.4.2
```
Build installers and upload the GitCode Release from this tag so the
published state is exactly reproducible.
4. **Only version-specific hotfixes go into a release branch during its
window**: new features always go to `main` for the next version, never into
an already-released branch (unless you deliberately ship a minor revision).
5. **Hotfixes MUST flow back to main**:
```bash
git checkout release/v1.4.2 # fix in the release branch
git commit -m "fix: ..."
git checkout main
git cherry-pick <hotfix-commit> # and into main
```
Most important rule: **main only moves forward and never loses fixes**. If a
hotfix never reaches main, the next release ships with the old bug.
### End of a version lifecycle
When the next version ships, the previous release branch retires:
- **Default: delete the remote release branch**
(`git push origin :release/v1.4.2`). All hotfixes were already
cherry-picked into main, so main contains everything; no merge needed.
- **Long-term maintenance** (e.g. an enterprise client pinned to an old
version): keep the branch, accept only security fixes, keep the
commit-then-cherry-pick loop.
## Explicit non-goals
- **Never rebase main**: main's history stays append-only; anyone pulling gets
directly usable history.
- **Release branches are not merged back wholesale**: hotfixes were already
cherry-picked; a whole-branch merge only creates conflicts with no benefit.
- **No "quick edit" directly on main**, even single-person: at minimum use
`feature/xxx → merge main` so history keeps its why-boundaries.
## Single vs multi person
- **Single** (this repo today): skip PRs — `git checkout -b feature/xxx` →
finish → merge back to main. Release branch + tag flow unchanged.
- **Multi / open source**: feature branches go through PR + Code Review,
maintainers merge; resolve conflicts on the feature branch, never on main.
## Commit message conventions
- `feat(...)`: new feature
- `fix(...)`: bug fix
- `chore(...)`: build / version / deps / non-code changes
- `docs(...)`: documentation
- `refactor(...)`: refactoring
- Scope in parens, e.g. `fix(adapters)`, `feat(webui)`, `chore(version)`
- One-line summary; expand with problem/root-cause/fix/verification when needed
## Release checklist (companion)
```bash
# 1. main is ready
git checkout main && git pull
# 2. cut release branch + tag
git checkout -b release/vX.Y.Z main
git tag -a vX.Y.Z -m "ModelRouter vX.Y.Z"
# 3. push branch + tag
git push origin release/vX.Y.Z
git push origin vX.Y.Z
# 4. build installers (core + GUI platforms)
make core-dist VERSION=X.Y.Z
# 5. create GitCode Release + upload
# https://gitcode.com/JianFeeeee/ModelRouter/releases
# upload MUST use PUT --http1.1, otherwise the OBS callback fails and the
# file never lands in the release; replacing artifacts = delete the tag
# (release disappears with it) then recreate.
```
## Why this model (background)
Before 2026-08 everything went straight to `main` plus a tag, which caused two
pain points:
1. After 1.4.2 shipped, a scheduler-scoring fix had to be added to the same
version — the only option was deleting the remote tag to clear the release
and re-uploading all installers. The published state was detached from code
history; "what exactly shipped" could not be traced.
2. No feature branches meant two independent efforts could not proceed in
parallel without colliding.
With release branches: the published state = `release/vX.Y.Z` branch +
`vX.Y.Z` tag, exactly reproducible; hotfixes have a clear landing spot; main
stays "latest + all fixes + deployable".
> 中文版见 [docs/git-workflow.md](git-workflow.md)。

128
docs/git-workflow.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
# Git 分支工作流(Branching Workflow)
ModelRouter 采用 **GitHub Flow + 发布分支** 模型:`main` 是唯一长命分支且永远可部署,
新工作从它开出特性分支;每个版本从 `main` 分出独立的发布分支并打 tag;hotfix 提交到
发布分支且必须回流 `main`。
目的:让「已发版的版本在生命周期内可被单独修补」成为一等操作,同时 `main` 始终包含
全部修复、永远可部署。
## 分支角色
| 分支 | 命名 | 生命周期 | 用途 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 主分支 | `main` | 永久 | 唯一长命分支。永远可部署。积攒下一个版本的功能。 |
| 特性分支 | `feature/<描述>` | 短命(开发→合并即删) | 新特性 / 一般 bug 修复。从 `main` 开出,完成后合回 `main`。 |
| 发布分支 | `release/vX.Y.Z` | 一个版本周期 | 从 `main` 分出,打 tag 发布。该版本生命周期内的 hotfix 都提交在此分支。 |
## 变更流向(重要)
```
feature/foo ───────┐
▼
main ──────────────── 下一个版本 ──────►
│ │
│ 切出 │ 切出
▼ ▼
release/v1.4.2 release/v1.4.3
│ │
tag: v1.4.2 tag: v1.4.3
│ │
hotfix ◄─────┘ hotfix ◄─────┘
│ │
└── cherry-pick 回 main ───────┘
```
### 关键规则
1. **main 永远可部署**:不在 main 上留半成品。任何未完成的工作必须在特性分支上。
2. **特性从 main 开,完成后合回 main**:`git checkout -b feature/xxx main`,
开发完 `git merge --no-ff feature/xxx` 或 squash 合回。
3. **发布 = 从 main 切 release 分支 + 打 tag**:
```bash
git checkout -b release/v1.4.2 main
git tag -a v1.4.2 -m "ModelRouter v1.4.2"
git push origin release/v1.4.2 v1.4.2
```
构建安装包、上传 GitCode Release 都基于这个 tag,保证可精确回溯发布态。
4. **版本生命周期内只收该版本的 hotfix**:新特性一律并入 `main` 等下一个版本,
绝不塞进已发布的 release 分支(除非主动选择在该版本内发次要版)。
5. **hotfix 必须回流 main**:
```bash
git checkout release/v1.4.2 # 在发布分支提交修复
git commit -m "fix: ..."
git checkout main
git cherry-pick <hotfix-commit> # 回主分支
```
这是本模型最重要的一条:**main 只前进、不丢修复**。如果 hotfix 不回 main,
下一个版本就会带着旧 bug 发布。
### 版本生命周期结束
下一个版本发布时,上一个 release 分支退役:
- **默认:直接删除远端 release 分支**(`git push origin :release/v1.4.2`)。
因为 hotfix 都已逐个 cherry-pick 回 main,main 已包含全部修复,无需再合并。
- **如需要长期维护旧版**(例如企业大客户卡在旧版本):保留分支,仅 stopship 接受
该版本的安全修复,继续走「提交 + cherry-pick 回 main」循环。
## 明确不做的事
- **不 rebase main**:`main` 的历史保持追加式,任何人拉取后 `git pull` 都得到直接可用的历史。
- **发布分支不整体 merge 回 main**:hotfix 已逐个 cherry-pick,整体合并只会制造冲突且无收益。
- **不在 main 直接写"临时改一下"**:即使是单人项目,也至少走
`feature/xxx → merge main` 的形式,让历史保留"为什么改"的边界。
## 单人 vs 多人
- **单人**(本项目当前):特性分支可省去 PR,`git checkout -b feature/xxx` →
完成 → 合并回 main。发布分支与 tag 流程完全一致。
- **多人 / 开源协作**:特性分支走 PR(pull request)+ Code Review,
由维护者 merge;冲突在特性分支上解决,不在 main 上解决。
## 提交信息规范(与分支配套)
- `feat(...)`: 新功能
- `fix(...)`: 修复
- `chore(...)`: 构建 / 版本号 / 依赖 / 文档无关改动
- `docs(...)`: 文档
- `refactor(...)`: 重构
- 括号内为影响域,如 `fix(adapters)`、`feat(webui)`、`chore(version)`
- 一句话总结,必要时正文展开「问题 / 根因 / 修复 / 验证」
## 发布操作速查(配套)
每次发布严格按此顺序:
```bash
# 1. 确认 main 就绪
git checkout main && git pull
# 2. 切发布分支并打 tag
git checkout -b release/vX.Y.Z main
git tag -a vX.Y.Z -m "ModelRouter vX.Y.Z"
# 3. 推送分支 + tag
git push origin release/vX.Y.Z
git push origin vX.Y.Z
# 4. 构建安装包(核心包 + GUI 各平台)
make core-dist VERSION=X.Y.Z
# 5. 创建 GitCode Release + 上传安装包
# 见 https://gitcode.com/JianFeeeee/ModelRouter/releases
# 上传注意:必须 PUT --http1.1,否则 OBS 回调失败文件不进列表;
# 替换旧版附件 = 删 tag(release 随 tag 一起消失)后重建。
```
## 为什么是这套(背景)
2026-08 之前本项目直接在所有改动提交到 `main` + 打 tag,出现两个痛点:
1. 1.4.2 已发版后又追了一个调度打分修复,只能删远端 tag 清空 release 再重传安装包
—— 版本发布态与代码历史脱节,无法精确回溯"当时发的是什么"。
2. 没有特性分支,无法并行开发互不干扰的两件事。
引入发布分支后:版本发布态 = `release/vX.Y.Z` 分支 + `vX.Y.Z` tag,可精确回溯;
hotfix 有明确落点;main 保持"最新 + 全部修复 + 可部署"。
> 英文版见 [docs/git-workflow-en.md](git-workflow-en.md)。

View File

@ -47,15 +47,19 @@ type Model struct {
// Source describes a single upstream LLM provider.
type Source struct {
Name string `yaml:"name" json:"name"`
BaseURL string `yaml:"base_url" json:"base_url"`
APIKey string `yaml:"api_key" json:"api_key"`
APIKeyEnv string `yaml:"api_key_env,omitempty" json:"-"` // reference to an env var holding the key (overrides api_key)
Adapter string `yaml:"adapter" json:"adapter"`
Endpoint string `yaml:"endpoint" json:"endpoint,omitempty"` // chat endpoint override
ImageEndpoint string `yaml:"image_endpoint" json:"image_endpoint,omitempty"` // image endpoint override
Models []Model `yaml:"models" json:"models"`
Headers map[string]string `yaml:"headers" json:"headers,omitempty"`
Name string `yaml:"name" json:"name"`
BaseURL string `yaml:"base_url" json:"base_url"`
APIKey string `yaml:"api_key" json:"api_key"`
APIKeyEnv string `yaml:"api_key_env,omitempty" json:"-"` // reference to an env var holding the key (overrides api_key)
Adapter string `yaml:"adapter" json:"adapter"`
Endpoint string `yaml:"endpoint" json:"endpoint,omitempty"` // chat endpoint override
ImageEndpoint string `yaml:"image_endpoint" json:"image_endpoint,omitempty"` // image endpoint override
Models []Model `yaml:"models" json:"models"`
Headers map[string]string `yaml:"headers" json:"headers,omitempty"`
// ProxyURL routes this source's HTTP(S) traffic through an explicit proxy
// (e.g. http://127.0.0.1:7890). Empty = direct connection. Needed for
// upstreams behind geo/IP blocks that only respond through a proxy.
ProxyURL string `yaml:"proxy_url" json:"proxy_url,omitempty"`
Meta map[string]interface{} `yaml:"meta" json:"meta,omitempty"`
Temperature float64 `yaml:"temperature" json:"temperature,omitempty"`
MaxTokens int `yaml:"max_tokens" json:"max_tokens,omitempty"`
@ -328,13 +332,15 @@ type RuntimeConfig struct {
// name and api_key) so the WebUI can spin up multiple key-bearing sources
// from one shared template.
type SourceTemplate struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
BaseURL string `json:"base_url"`
Adapter string `json:"adapter"`
Endpoint string `json:"endpoint,omitempty"`
ImageEndpoint string `json:"image_endpoint,omitempty"`
Models []Model `json:"models"`
Headers map[string]string `json:"headers,omitempty"`
Name string `json:"name"`
BaseURL string `json:"base_url"`
Adapter string `json:"adapter"`
Endpoint string `json:"endpoint,omitempty"`
ImageEndpoint string `json:"image_endpoint,omitempty"`
Models []Model `json:"models"`
Headers map[string]string `json:"headers,omitempty"`
// ProxyURL routes this source's HTTP(S) traffic through an explicit proxy.
ProxyURL string `json:"proxy_url,omitempty"`
Meta map[string]interface{} `json:"meta,omitempty"`
Temperature float64 `json:"temperature,omitempty"`
MaxTokens int `json:"max_tokens,omitempty"`

View File

@ -115,13 +115,15 @@ func (g *Gateway) resolveCands(ctx context.Context, req *chatRequest) ([]*provid
}
// filterCandsByModels keeps only providers exposing at least one model of the
// scope (used for user keys with a restricted model scope). An "AUTO" scope
// entry means the key is allowed to use any model. Scope entries with a
// Source pinned to a specific upstream narrow the candidates to that source
// scope (used for user keys with a restricted model scope). Scope entries with
// a Source pinned to a specific upstream narrow the candidates to that source
// for the matching model.
//
// An "AUTO" scope entry only allows the AUTO routing mode; it does NOT grant
// access to specific models.
func filterCandsByModels(cands []*provider.Provider, allow []config.ModelScope) []*provider.Provider {
for _, m := range allow {
if m.Model == "" || strings.EqualFold(m.Model, "AUTO") {
if m.Model == "" {
return cands
}
}
@ -152,20 +154,18 @@ func filterCandsByModels(cands []*provider.Provider, allow []config.ModelScope)
return out
}
// intersectModels restricts a model list to the scope (preserving order). An
// "AUTO" scope entry grants every model.
// intersectModels restricts a model list to the scope (preserving order).
// An "AUTO" scope entry only allows the AUTO routing mode; it does NOT grant
// every model.
func intersectModels(models []string, allow []config.ModelScope) []string {
allowed := make(map[string]bool, len(allow))
any := false
for _, m := range allow {
if m.Model == "" || strings.EqualFold(m.Model, "AUTO") {
any = true
break
if m.Model == "" {
return models
}
if !strings.EqualFold(m.Model, "AUTO") {
allowed[m.Model] = true
}
allowed[m.Model] = true
}
if any {
return models
}
out := make([]string, 0, len(models))
seen := map[string]bool{}
@ -179,24 +179,16 @@ func intersectModels(models []string, allow []config.ModelScope) []string {
}
// checkModelScope validates the effective model against the key's model scope
// and token quota. Returns an error message when rejected. A scope entry with
// model "AUTO" grants all models; its quota caps the key's total tokens.
// and token quota. Returns an error message when rejected.
//
// A scope entry with model "AUTO" only allows requests where the effective
// model is AUTO (the routing mode). It does NOT grant access to specific model
// ids — that requires an explicit scope entry for the model.
func (g *Gateway) checkModelScope(ctx context.Context, model string) string {
allow := g.allowedModels(ctx)
if allow == nil {
return ""
}
for _, sc := range allow {
if sc.Model != "" && strings.EqualFold(sc.Model, "AUTO") {
if sc.TokenQuota > 0 {
used := g.scopeTokens(ctx, sc)
if used >= sc.TokenQuota {
return fmt.Sprintf("token quota exceeded (%d/%d)", used, sc.TokenQuota)
}
}
return ""
}
}
for _, sc := range allow {
if sc.Model != model {
continue
@ -229,12 +221,15 @@ func (g *Gateway) scopeTokens(ctx context.Context, sc config.ModelScope) int64 {
// source that actually serves the bare model (via Registry.EffectiveModel), so
// model ids that themselves contain separators (e.g. "deepseek-v4-flash-free")
// are never corrupted (P10-2).
//
// A scope entry with model "AUTO" only matches the literal AUTO routing mode;
// it does NOT grant access to specific model ids.
func (g *Gateway) hasScopeModel(list []config.ModelScope, s string) bool {
if r := g.core.Registry(); r != nil {
s = r.EffectiveModel(s)
}
for _, x := range list {
if x.Model == s || (x.Model != "" && strings.EqualFold(x.Model, "AUTO")) {
if x.Model == s {
return true
}
}

View File

@ -670,8 +670,11 @@ func TestHasScopeModelWithSourcePrefix(t *testing.T) {
if g.hasScopeModel(scope, "deepseek-v4-flash-free-extra") {
t.Error("hasScopeModel returned true for unrelated model")
}
if !g.hasScopeModel([]config.ModelScope{{Model: "AUTO"}}, "zen:anything") {
t.Error("AUTO scope should allow any prefixed model")
if g.hasScopeModel([]config.ModelScope{{Model: "AUTO"}}, "zen:deepseek-v4-flash-free") {
t.Error("AUTO scope must NOT grant specific model ids even with prefix")
}
if g.hasScopeModel([]config.ModelScope{{Model: "AUTO"}}, "deepseek-v4-pro") {
t.Error("AUTO scope must NOT grant specific model ids")
}
}

View File

@ -5,12 +5,34 @@ adapter.version = "1.0.0"
adapter.endpoint = "/chat/completions"
adapter.headers = {}
-- AgentRouter 的 WAF 会按客户端指纹白名单校验,只放行官方客户端。
-- 这里通过 build_headers 注入官方客户端 User-Agent 以通过校验。
-- 默认 QwenCode 指纹(实测可通);可在 source.meta.user_agent 覆盖成 Claude Code 指纹。
-- AgentRouter 的阿里云 WAF 按三重维度校验:出口 IP(必须海外)、
-- TLS 指纹(JS/Go HTTP 层与 curl 不同)、浏览器指纹 header 集。
-- 纯 UA 已不够:WAF 拦 12 种 agent CLI UA 中的 10 种(全 405 HTML),
-- 只有同时带 Origin: qwen.ai + Referer + X-Requested-With 才放行,
-- 且同 IP 短时间连续 3+ 次请求会被速率封禁,靠 adapter 侧低频调用 +
-- llmsproxy 的 prefFailStep 冷却自然限制,来源无法控制速率。
local default_ua = "QwenCode/0.2.0 (linux; x64)"
-- AgentRouter fronts Claude models (claude-opus-4-8), and Claude upstreams
-- enforce Anthropic's tool id rule ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}$ by rejecting the WHOLE
-- request. Plain OpenAI does not, so an id minted by a permissive model (e.g.
-- "bash:0" from moonshotai/kimi-k3) is replayed here by the client and kills
-- every turn. See anthropic.lua / openai.lua for the same helper: Lua adapters
-- have no shared prelude, so each carries its own copy.
local TOOL_ID_MAX = 64
local function safe_tool_id(id)
if type(id) ~= "string" or id == "" then return id end
local clean = string.gsub(id, "[^A-Za-z0-9_-]", "_")
if clean == id and #clean <= TOOL_ID_MAX then
return clean
end
local digest = string.sub(sha256_hex(id), 1, 8)
local keep = TOOL_ID_MAX - #digest - 1
if #clean > keep then clean = string.sub(clean, 1, keep) end
return clean .. "_" .. digest
end
function adapter.transform_request(raw_body)
local ok, req = pcall(json.decode, raw_body)
if not ok then return raw_body end
@ -19,6 +41,16 @@ function adapter.transform_request(raw_body)
if req.messages then
for _, msg in ipairs(req.messages) do
msg.reasoning_content = nil
if msg.tool_call_id ~= nil then
msg.tool_call_id = safe_tool_id(msg.tool_call_id)
end
if type(msg.tool_calls) == "table" then
for _, tc in ipairs(msg.tool_calls) do
if type(tc) == "table" and tc.id ~= nil then
tc.id = safe_tool_id(tc.id)
end
end
end
end
end
return json.encode(req)
@ -35,6 +67,13 @@ function adapter.build_headers(meta)
["Content-Type"] = "application/json",
["Authorization"] = "Bearer " .. meta.api_key,
["User-Agent"] = ua,
-- QwenCode client fingerprint: WAF rejects bare UA without these.
["Accept"] = "application/json, text/plain, */*",
["Accept-Language"] = "zh-CN,zh;q=0.9",
["Origin"] = "https://qwen.ai",
["Referer"] = "https://qwen.ai/",
["X-Requested-With"] = "XMLHttpRequest",
["Connection"] = "keep-alive",
}
end
@ -79,7 +118,7 @@ function adapter.transform_response(raw_body)
local args_ok, args = pcall(json.decode, tc["function"].arguments)
if not args_ok then args = {} end
table.insert(tcs, {
id = tc.id,
id = safe_tool_id(tc.id),
type = tc.type or "function",
name = tc["function"].name,
arguments = args
@ -138,6 +177,15 @@ function adapter.transform_stream_chunk(raw_chunk)
unified.reasoning_content = delta.reasoning_content
end
if delta.tool_calls then
-- Sanitize outbound too: a dirty id must never enter a client session,
-- because the client replays it to every other source. Only the first
-- fragment of a streamed call carries an id; later argument fragments
-- have none and must stay id-less for index-based accumulation.
for _, tc in ipairs(delta.tool_calls) do
if type(tc) == "table" and tc.id ~= nil then
tc.id = safe_tool_id(tc.id)
end
end
unified.tool_calls = delta.tool_calls
end
if uses ~= nil then

View File

@ -14,6 +14,70 @@ local ROLE_WHITELIST = {
system = true, user = true, assistant = true, tool = true,
}
-- Anthropic requires tool_use.id / tool_result.tool_use_id to match
-- ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}$ and rejects the WHOLE request otherwise with
-- REQUEST_BODY_INVALID / "Invalid tool use format". OpenAI imposes no such
-- rule, so an OpenAI-compatible upstream can hand a client an id like
-- "bash:0" (observed from moonshotai/kimi-k3); once that lands in the
-- client's history, every later replay kills every Claude slot at once and
-- an AUTO chain falls through all tiers.
--
-- safe_tool_id is pure and deterministic, so a tool_use block and its
-- matching tool_result are rewritten identically within one request. A
-- rewritten id keeps an 8-hex digest of the ORIGINAL id: without it two
-- distinct ids could collapse into one ("a:b" and "a_b"), which Anthropic
-- rejects as a duplicate/unpaired tool_use. Already-legal ids pass through
-- untouched so upstreams that round-trip their own ids are unaffected.
local TOOL_ID_MAX = 64
local function safe_tool_id(id)
if type(id) ~= "string" or id == "" then return "" end
local clean = string.gsub(id, "[^A-Za-z0-9_-]", "_")
if clean == id and #clean <= TOOL_ID_MAX then
return clean
end
local digest = string.sub(sha256_hex(id), 1, 8)
local keep = TOOL_ID_MAX - #digest - 1
if #clean > keep then clean = string.sub(clean, 1, keep) end
return clean .. "_" .. digest
end
-- map_usage converts one Anthropic usage object to the gateway's TokenUsage
-- shape. The two APIs disagree on what the prompt count MEANS:
--
-- Anthropic: input_tokens EXCLUDES cached blocks. cache_read_input_tokens and
-- cache_creation_input_tokens are separate, additive, billed input.
-- OpenAI: prompt_tokens INCLUDES its cached_tokens subset.
--
-- Mapping input_tokens straight onto prompt therefore did two wrong things at
-- once: it undercounted the billed prompt by the entire cache portion, and it
-- could report cached_tokens > prompt_tokens — a cache hit rate above 100%.
-- cache_creation_input_tokens was not read at all, so a cache-write turn lost
-- those billed tokens outright. Summing all three restores OpenAI semantics,
-- which is what clients (and the gateway's own audit trail) assume.
--
-- Returns nil when the object carries no counts, so callers can keep treating
-- "no usage in this chunk" as "say nothing" rather than reporting zeros.
local function map_usage(u)
if type(u) ~= "table" then return nil end
local fresh = u.input_tokens or 0
local read = u.cache_read_input_tokens or 0
local create = u.cache_creation_input_tokens or 0
local p = fresh + read + create
local c = u.output_tokens or 0
if p <= 0 and c <= 0 then return nil end
local uses = { prompt = p, completion = c, total = p + c }
-- Emit the split whenever Anthropic reports either cache field, even at 0:
-- a reported zero-hit ("cache missed") must stay distinguishable from "this
-- upstream never reports cache info at all".
if u.cache_read_input_tokens ~= nil or u.cache_creation_input_tokens ~= nil then
uses.prompt_tokens_details = { cached_tokens = read }
uses.prompt_cache_hit_tokens = read
uses.prompt_cache_miss_tokens = fresh + create
end
return uses
end
local function collect_blocks(content)
if type(content) == "string" then
if content == "" then return {} end
@ -104,7 +168,7 @@ function adapter.transform_request(raw_body)
end
table.insert(blocks, {
type = "tool_use",
id = tc.id or "",
id = safe_tool_id(tc.id),
name = fn.name or "",
input = input,
})
@ -119,7 +183,7 @@ function adapter.transform_request(raw_body)
-- user message with tool_result content blocks.
table.insert(pending_tool, {
type = "tool_result",
tool_use_id = m.tool_call_id or "",
tool_use_id = safe_tool_id(m.tool_call_id),
content = text_of(m.content),
})
@ -220,17 +284,9 @@ function adapter.transform_response(raw_body)
token_usage = { prompt = 0, completion = 0, total = 0 },
}
if resp.usage then
unified.token_usage.prompt = resp.usage.input_tokens or 0
unified.token_usage.completion = resp.usage.output_tokens or 0
unified.token_usage.total = (resp.usage.input_tokens or 0) + (resp.usage.output_tokens or 0)
-- Emit details whenever Anthropic reports the field, even at 0, so a
-- reported cache miss stays distinguishable from "not reported".
if resp.usage.cache_read_input_tokens ~= nil then
unified.token_usage.prompt_tokens_details = {
cached_tokens = resp.usage.cache_read_input_tokens
}
end
local mapped = map_usage(resp.usage)
if mapped ~= nil then
unified.token_usage = mapped
end
if resp.content and #resp.content > 0 then
@ -242,7 +298,7 @@ function adapter.transform_response(raw_body)
unified.reasoning_content = (unified.reasoning_content or "") .. block.thinking
elseif block.type == "tool_use" then
table.insert(tcs, {
id = block.id or "",
id = safe_tool_id(block.id),
type = "function",
name = block.name or "",
arguments = block.input or {},
@ -275,17 +331,13 @@ function adapter.transform_stream_chunk(raw_chunk)
-- ── message_start: initial usage ─────────────────────────
if chunk.type == "message_start" then
if chunk.message and type(chunk.message.usage) == "table" then
local u = chunk.message.usage
local p = u.input_tokens or 0
local c = u.output_tokens or 0
if p > 0 or c > 0 then
local uses = { prompt = p, completion = c, total = p + c }
if u.cache_read_input_tokens ~= nil then
uses.prompt_tokens_details = {
cached_tokens = u.cache_read_input_tokens
}
end
if chunk.message then
-- Some Anthropic-compatible upstreams report a placeholder here and
-- only send the true prompt count in message_delta (justwoker:
-- 160 at message_start vs 6931 at message_delta). The gateway's
-- mergeUsage lets a later non-zero value win, so both are emitted.
local uses = map_usage(chunk.message.usage)
if uses ~= nil then
return json.encode({ usage = uses, done = false })
end
end
@ -305,15 +357,10 @@ function adapter.transform_stream_chunk(raw_chunk)
finish = "stop"
end
end
local uses = nil
if type(chunk.usage) == "table" then
local u = chunk.usage
local p = u.input_tokens or 0
local c = u.output_tokens or 0
if p > 0 or c > 0 then
uses = { prompt = p, completion = c, total = p + c }
end
end
-- message_delta carries the FINAL usage, so it must map the cache
-- fields too; the old code dropped them here, which silently lost the
-- whole cache split on every streamed response.
local uses = map_usage(chunk.usage)
if uses ~= nil then
return json.encode({ content = "", done = (finish ~= nil), finish_reason = finish, usage = uses })
end
@ -330,7 +377,7 @@ function adapter.transform_stream_chunk(raw_chunk)
content = "", done = false,
tool_calls = { {
index = chunk.index or 0,
id = cb.id or "",
id = safe_tool_id(cb.id),
type = "function",
["function"] = { name = cb.name or "", arguments = "" },
} },

View File

@ -5,6 +5,36 @@ adapter.version = "2.0.0"
adapter.endpoint = "/chat/completions"
adapter.headers = {}
-- Claude-behind-OpenAI upstreams (tabitoken, 扇贝, …) convert /chat/completions
-- to the Anthropic Messages API internally, so they inherit Anthropic's
-- tool id rule: ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}$, enforced by rejecting the WHOLE request
-- with "Invalid tool use format" / "tool_use.id: String should match pattern".
-- Plain OpenAI has no such rule, so an OpenAI-compatible model can mint an id
-- like "bash:0" (observed from moonshotai/kimi-k3). In a fan-out router that id
-- is replayed to every other source, so one such id kills every Claude slot at
-- once and an AUTO request falls through all tiers.
--
-- safe_tool_id is pure and deterministic, so a tool_calls entry and its
-- matching tool_call_id are rewritten identically within one request. A
-- rewritten id keeps an 8-hex digest of the ORIGINAL id, without which two
-- distinct ids could collapse into one ("a:b" and "a_b") and become an
-- unpaired/duplicate tool call. Already-legal ids are returned untouched, so
-- well-behaved traffic is byte-identical to before.
-- (anthropic.lua carries the same helper; Lua adapters have no shared prelude.)
local TOOL_ID_MAX = 64
local function safe_tool_id(id)
if type(id) ~= "string" or id == "" then return id end
local clean = string.gsub(id, "[^A-Za-z0-9_-]", "_")
if clean == id and #clean <= TOOL_ID_MAX then
return clean
end
local digest = string.sub(sha256_hex(id), 1, 8)
local keep = TOOL_ID_MAX - #digest - 1
if #clean > keep then clean = string.sub(clean, 1, keep) end
return clean .. "_" .. digest
end
-- OpenAI /chat/completions format (pass-through, strip provider-specific fields)
function adapter.transform_request(raw_body)
local ok, req = pcall(json.decode, raw_body)
@ -14,6 +44,16 @@ function adapter.transform_request(raw_body)
if req.messages then
for _, msg in ipairs(req.messages) do
msg.reasoning_content = nil
if msg.tool_call_id ~= nil then
msg.tool_call_id = safe_tool_id(msg.tool_call_id)
end
if type(msg.tool_calls) == "table" then
for _, tc in ipairs(msg.tool_calls) do
if type(tc) == "table" and tc.id ~= nil then
tc.id = safe_tool_id(tc.id)
end
end
end
end
end
return json.encode(req)
@ -64,7 +104,7 @@ function adapter.transform_response(raw_body)
local args_ok, args = pcall(json.decode, tc["function"].arguments)
if not args_ok then args = {} end
table.insert(tcs, {
id = tc.id,
id = safe_tool_id(tc.id),
type = tc.type or "function",
name = tc["function"].name,
arguments = args
@ -129,6 +169,15 @@ function adapter.transform_stream_chunk(raw_chunk)
unified.reasoning_content = delta.reasoning_content
end
if delta.tool_calls then
-- Sanitize on the way OUT too: an id this upstream happily minted (it
-- does not validate them) becomes a landmine once the client replays
-- it to a Claude upstream. Only the first fragment of a streamed call
-- carries an id; later argument fragments have none and are untouched.
for _, tc in ipairs(delta.tool_calls) do
if type(tc) == "table" and tc.id ~= nil then
tc.id = safe_tool_id(tc.id)
end
end
unified.tool_calls = delta.tool_calls
end
return json.encode(unified)

View File

@ -34,8 +34,10 @@ end
-- OpenAI /chat/completions format (pass-through, strip provider-specific fields)
-- zen 上游 schema 只接受 text content part(无视觉/音频能力):多模态 part
-- (image_url / input_audio / file 等)一律剥离;因此失去全部 content 的
-- 消息整条丢弃,避免上游 "unknown variant `image_url`, expected `text`"。
-- (image_url / input_audio / file 等)一律剥离。剥离后 content 变空的消息
-- 若不再携带 tool_calls / tool_call_id 才整条丢弃(避免上游
-- "unknown variant `image_url`, expected `text`");带工具调用的必须保留,
-- 否则会把紧随其后的 tool 结果变成孤儿,模型会反复重发同一个调用。
-- zen 上游角色白名单只有 system / user / assistant / tool / latest_reminder:
-- OpenAI 的 developer(及 function 等)不在其中,直接透传会触发上游
-- "unknown variant `developer`, expected one of ..." 错误;统一归一化为 system。
@ -72,7 +74,24 @@ function adapter.transform_request(raw_body)
end
end
if #parts == 0 then
drop = true
-- Content collapsed to nothing after stripping unsupported
-- parts. A message that still carries a tool call must
-- NEVER be dropped: the very next message is its tool
-- result, and dropping the call orphans that result. The
-- model then sees a result for a call it never made and
-- re-issues the same tool call on every turn (observed as
-- an infinite "repeated tool call" loop).
--
-- This is the common shape for agent clients: an assistant
-- turn whose content is only [thinking, toolCall] serialises
-- to content:[] with tool_calls — exactly the case that used
-- to vanish here. Emit "" instead, which zen accepts.
if (type(msg.tool_calls) == "table" and #msg.tool_calls > 0)
or msg.tool_call_id ~= nil then
msg.content = ""
else
drop = true
end
else
msg.content = parts
end

View File

@ -46,9 +46,6 @@ end
-- Returns (tool_calls_array_or_nil, content_with_blocks_removed).
local function parse_text_tool_calls(content)
if type(content) ~= "string" or content == "" then return nil, content end
if not (content:find("<tool_call", 1, true) or content:find("<toolcall", 1, true)) then
return nil, content
end
local tcs = {}
local idx = 0
@ -88,11 +85,31 @@ local function parse_text_tool_calls(content)
collect("<tool_call[^>]*>%s*(.-)%s*</tool_call%s*>")
collect("<toolcall[^>]*>%s*(.-)%s*</toolcall%s*>")
-- Legacy / mimicked form: models that saw past assistant turns folded as
-- [Called tool: name({...})]
-- tend to emit the same shape instead of a real block. Recover it so
-- the agent loop keeps working; otherwise the client receives plain text
-- where a structured tool call should be. Capture the name and the JSON
-- object literal independently (the JSON is the only {...} run here).
if #tcs == 0 and content:find("%[Called tool") then
for name, argsraw in content:gmatch("%[Called tool%s*:%s*([%w_%-%.]+)%s*%((%b{})%s*%)%s*%]") do
local aok, decoded = pcall(json.decode, argsraw)
idx = idx + 1
table.insert(tcs, {
id = "call_legacy_" .. idx,
type = "function",
name = name,
arguments = aok and decoded or {}
})
end
end
if #tcs == 0 then return nil, content end
-- drop the blocks from user-visible content; keep any surrounding prose
local stripped = content:gsub("<tool_call[^>]*>%s*.-%s*</tool_call%s*>", "")
stripped = stripped:gsub("<toolcall[^>]*>%s*.-%s*</toolcall%s*>", "")
stripped = stripped:gsub("%[Called tool%s*:%s*[%w_%-%.]+%s*%(%b{}%s*%)%s*%]", "")
stripped = stripped:gsub("^%s+", ""):gsub("%s+$", "")
return tcs, stripped
end

View File

@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"regexp"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
@ -220,6 +221,70 @@ func TestOpenCodeStripsMultiModalParts(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestOpenCodeKeepsToolCallWithEmptyContent pins the fix for an infinite
// "repeated tool call" loop: an assistant turn whose content serialises to an
// empty ARRAY while carrying tool_calls must survive the multimodal strip.
// Dropping it orphans the following tool result, so the model never sees the
// call it already made and re-issues it on every turn.
func TestOpenCodeKeepsToolCallWithEmptyContent(t *testing.T) {
vm := NewVM(freshAdapterDir(t))
if err := vm.Start(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer vm.Stop()
body := `{"model":"x","messages":[
{"role":"user","content":"read /tmp/x"},
{"role":"assistant","content":[],"tool_calls":[{"id":"call_abc","type":"function","function":{"name":"read","arguments":"{\"path\":\"/tmp/x\"}"}}]},
{"role":"tool","tool_call_id":"call_abc","content":"hello"},
{"role":"user","content":"now summarize"}
]}`
out, err := vm.Transform("opencode", "transform_request", body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("transform_request: %v", err)
}
var req struct {
Messages []struct {
Role string `json:"role"`
Content json.RawMessage `json:"content"`
ToolCalls []struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
} `json:"tool_calls"`
ToolCallID string `json:"tool_call_id"`
} `json:"messages"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(out), &req); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unmarshal: %v (%s)", err, out)
}
if len(req.Messages) != 4 {
t.Fatalf("expected 4 messages (tool call must not be dropped), got %d: %s", len(req.Messages), out)
}
asst := req.Messages[1]
if asst.Role != "assistant" || len(asst.ToolCalls) != 1 || asst.ToolCalls[0].ID != "call_abc" {
t.Fatalf("assistant tool_calls lost: %s", out)
}
if string(asst.Content) != `""` {
t.Fatalf("empty content must be rewritten to \"\", got %s", asst.Content)
}
if req.Messages[2].Role != "tool" || req.Messages[2].ToolCallID != "call_abc" {
t.Fatalf("tool result must stay paired with its call: %s", out)
}
// Negative control: a message with neither text nor tool calls is still dropped.
only := `{"model":"x","messages":[
{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"image_url","image_url":{"url":"https://ex.com/a.png"}}]},
{"role":"user","content":"keep me"}
]}`
out2, err := vm.Transform("opencode", "transform_request", only)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if got := strings.Count(out2, `"role"`); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("image-only message without tool calls must still be dropped, got %d: %s", got, out2)
}
}
func TestBuildHeadersCustomHook(t *testing.T) {
vm := NewVM(freshAdapterDir(t))
if err := vm.Start(); err != nil {
@ -1599,3 +1664,424 @@ func TestTraeTextToolCallRecovery(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("plain answer finish_reason changed: %s", out)
}
}
// TestToolIDSanitize locks the tool-call id sanitizer in both adapters that
// talk to Claude upstreams. Anthropic requires tool_use.id /
// tool_result.tool_use_id to match ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}$ and rejects the WHOLE
// request otherwise (REQUEST_BODY_INVALID / "Invalid tool use format"), while
// OpenAI has no such rule — so an OpenAI-compatible model can mint "bash:0"
// (observed from moonshotai/kimi-k3) and poison a client's history, killing
// every Claude slot on replay. tabitoken/扇贝 are Claude-behind-OpenAI, so
// openai.lua needs the same treatment as anthropic.lua.
func TestToolIDSanitize(t *testing.T) {
vm := NewVM(freshAdapterDir(t))
if err := vm.Start(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer vm.Stop()
legal := regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}$`)
long := strings.Repeat("a", 200)
body := func(id string) string {
b, err := json.Marshal(map[string]interface{}{
"model": "x",
"messages": []interface{}{
map[string]interface{}{"role": "user", "content": "run whoami"},
map[string]interface{}{"role": "assistant", "content": "", "tool_calls": []interface{}{
map[string]interface{}{"id": id, "type": "function",
"function": map[string]interface{}{"name": "bash", "arguments": `{"command":"whoami"}`}},
}},
map[string]interface{}{"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": id, "content": "root"},
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return string(b)
}
// ---- anthropic: tool_use.id and tool_result.tool_use_id must agree ----
for _, id := range []string{"bash:0", "call_ok_123", long, "toolu~sig1:AB+/=="} {
out, err := vm.Transform("anthropic", "transform_request", body(id))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("anthropic transform %q: %v", id, err)
}
var r struct {
Messages []struct {
Content []struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
ID string `json:"id"`
ToolUseID string `json:"tool_use_id"`
} `json:"content"`
} `json:"messages"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(out), &r); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("anthropic unmarshal %q: %v (%s)", id, err, out)
}
var useID, resID string
for _, m := range r.Messages {
for _, c := range m.Content {
switch c.Type {
case "tool_use":
useID = c.ID
case "tool_result":
resID = c.ToolUseID
}
}
}
if !legal.MatchString(useID) {
t.Errorf("anthropic %q: tool_use.id %q violates Anthropic's id pattern", id, useID)
}
if useID != resID {
t.Errorf("anthropic %q: tool_use.id %q != tool_result.tool_use_id %q (unpaired call)", id, useID, resID)
}
if legal.MatchString(id) && useID != id {
t.Errorf("anthropic %q: already-legal id must pass through untouched, got %q", id, useID)
}
}
// ---- openai + agentrouter: same rewrite, and both sites must stay in sync ----
// agentrouter fronts claude-opus-4-8, so it inherits the same id rule.
for _, adapterName := range []string{"openai", "agentrouter"} {
for _, id := range []string{"bash:0", "call_ok_123", long} {
out, err := vm.Transform(adapterName, "transform_request", body(id))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s transform %q: %v", adapterName, id, err)
}
var r struct {
Messages []struct {
Role string `json:"role"`
ToolCalls []struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
} `json:"tool_calls"`
ToolCallID string `json:"tool_call_id"`
} `json:"messages"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(out), &r); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s unmarshal %q: %v (%s)", adapterName, id, err, out)
}
var callID, resID string
for _, m := range r.Messages {
if len(m.ToolCalls) > 0 {
callID = m.ToolCalls[0].ID
}
if m.Role == "tool" {
resID = m.ToolCallID
}
}
if !legal.MatchString(callID) {
t.Errorf("%s %q: tool_calls[0].id %q still illegal for Claude-behind-OpenAI upstreams", adapterName, id, callID)
}
if callID != resID {
t.Errorf("%s %q: tool_calls id %q != tool_call_id %q (unpaired call)", adapterName, id, callID, resID)
}
if legal.MatchString(id) && callID != id {
t.Errorf("%s %q: already-legal id must pass through untouched, got %q", adapterName, id, callID)
}
}
}
// ---- distinct dirty ids must NOT collapse into one (digest suffix) ----
seen := map[string]string{}
for _, id := range []string{"a:b", "a_b", "a-b", "a b", "a/b"} {
out, err := vm.Transform("anthropic", "transform_request", body(id))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("collision probe %q: %v", id, err)
}
var r struct {
Messages []struct {
Content []struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
ID string `json:"id"`
} `json:"content"`
} `json:"messages"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(out), &r); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
got := ""
for _, m := range r.Messages {
for _, c := range m.Content {
if c.Type == "tool_use" {
got = c.ID
}
}
}
if prev, dup := seen[got]; dup {
t.Errorf("ids %q and %q both map to %q — a collision makes a duplicate tool_use", prev, id, got)
}
seen[got] = id
}
// ---- determinism: same input, same output ----
a, _ := vm.Transform("anthropic", "transform_request", body("bash:0"))
b, _ := vm.Transform("anthropic", "transform_request", body("bash:0"))
if a != b {
t.Errorf("sanitizer is not deterministic:\n%s\n%s", a, b)
}
}
// TestToolIDSanitizeResponse locks the OUTBOUND half of the sanitizer. The
// request-side rewrite alone is not enough: an id minted by a permissive
// OpenAI-compatible upstream (moonshotai/kimi-k3 returns "bash:0") is handed to
// the client, stored in its history, and replayed forever after. Sanitizing on
// the way out means a poisoned id never enters a client session in the first
// place — both for non-streaming responses and for the first fragment of a
// streamed tool call (later argument fragments carry no id).
func TestToolIDSanitizeResponse(t *testing.T) {
vm := NewVM(freshAdapterDir(t))
if err := vm.Start(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer vm.Stop()
legal := regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}$`)
// ---- openai + agentrouter non-streaming ----
resp := `{"choices":[{"message":{"role":"assistant","content":null,"tool_calls":[
{"id":"bash:0","type":"function","function":{"name":"bash","arguments":"{\"command\":\"whoami\"}"}}]},
"finish_reason":"tool_calls"}]}`
var nonStreamID string
for _, adapterName := range []string{"openai", "agentrouter"} {
out, err := vm.Transform(adapterName, "transform_response", resp)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s transform_response: %v", adapterName, err)
}
var r struct {
ToolCalls []struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
} `json:"tool_calls"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(out), &r); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s unmarshal: %v (%s)", adapterName, err, out)
}
if len(r.ToolCalls) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("%s tool_calls lost: %s", adapterName, out)
}
if !legal.MatchString(r.ToolCalls[0].ID) {
t.Errorf("%s non-stream response leaks illegal id %q to the client", adapterName, r.ToolCalls[0].ID)
}
if nonStreamID != "" && r.ToolCalls[0].ID != nonStreamID {
t.Errorf("%s rewrote %q differently than another adapter (%q) — a client mixing sources gets unpaired calls",
adapterName, r.ToolCalls[0].ID, nonStreamID)
}
nonStreamID = r.ToolCalls[0].ID
}
// ---- streaming: first fragment carries the id (both adapters) ----
chunk := `{"choices":[{"delta":{"tool_calls":[
{"index":0,"id":"bash:0","type":"function","function":{"name":"bash","arguments":""}}]},
"finish_reason":null}]}`
var c struct {
ToolCalls []struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
} `json:"tool_calls"`
}
for _, adapterName := range []string{"openai", "agentrouter"} {
out, err := vm.Transform(adapterName, "transform_stream_chunk", chunk)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s transform_stream_chunk: %v", adapterName, err)
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(out), &c); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s unmarshal chunk: %v (%s)", adapterName, err, out)
}
if len(c.ToolCalls) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("%s stream tool_calls lost: %s", adapterName, out)
}
if !legal.MatchString(c.ToolCalls[0].ID) {
t.Errorf("%s stream response leaks illegal id %q to the client", adapterName, c.ToolCalls[0].ID)
}
// Streaming and non-streaming must agree, otherwise a client that mixes
// modes within one session produces unpaired tool calls.
if c.ToolCalls[0].ID != nonStreamID {
t.Errorf("%s stream id %q != non-stream id %q for the same input", adapterName, c.ToolCalls[0].ID, nonStreamID)
}
}
// ---- a later argument fragment has no id and must stay id-less ----
argChunk := `{"choices":[{"delta":{"tool_calls":[
{"index":0,"function":{"arguments":"{\"command\":\"whoami\"}"}}]},"finish_reason":null}]}`
for _, adapterName := range []string{"openai", "agentrouter"} {
out, err := vm.Transform(adapterName, "transform_stream_chunk", argChunk)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s arg fragment: %v", adapterName, err)
}
if strings.Contains(out, `"id"`) {
t.Errorf("%s argument fragment gained an id (breaks index-based accumulation): %s", adapterName, out)
}
}
// ---- anthropic response side: tool_use id and stream start ----
var r struct {
ToolCalls []struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
} `json:"tool_calls"`
}
aResp := `{"content":[{"type":"tool_use","id":"toolu~sig1:AB+/==","name":"bash","input":{"command":"whoami"}}],"stop_reason":"tool_use"}`
out, err := vm.Transform("anthropic", "transform_response", aResp)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("anthropic transform_response: %v", err)
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(out), &r); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unmarshal anthropic: %v (%s)", err, out)
}
if len(r.ToolCalls) != 1 || !legal.MatchString(r.ToolCalls[0].ID) {
t.Errorf("anthropic response leaks illegal id: %s", out)
}
aChunk := `{"type":"content_block_start","index":0,"content_block":{"type":"tool_use","id":"toolu~sig1:AB+/==","name":"bash"}}`
out, err = vm.Transform("anthropic", "transform_stream_chunk", aChunk)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("anthropic stream chunk: %v", err)
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(out), &c); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unmarshal anthropic chunk: %v (%s)", err, out)
}
if len(c.ToolCalls) != 1 || !legal.MatchString(c.ToolCalls[0].ID) {
t.Errorf("anthropic stream leaks illegal id: %s", out)
}
}
// TestAnthropicUsageCacheMapping pins the Anthropic→OpenAI usage conversion.
// The two APIs disagree on what the prompt count means: Anthropic's
// input_tokens EXCLUDES cached blocks (cache_read_input_tokens and
// cache_creation_input_tokens are separate, additive, billed input), while
// OpenAI's prompt_tokens INCLUDES its cached_tokens subset. Mapping
// input_tokens straight onto prompt undercounted the billed prompt by the whole
// cache portion and could report cached_tokens > prompt_tokens (a hit rate over
// 100%); cache_creation_input_tokens was dropped entirely.
func TestAnthropicUsageCacheMapping(t *testing.T) {
vm := NewVM(freshAdapterDir(t))
if err := vm.Start(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer vm.Stop()
type usage struct {
Prompt int `json:"prompt"`
Completion int `json:"completion"`
Total int `json:"total"`
Details *struct {
CachedTokens int `json:"cached_tokens"`
} `json:"prompt_tokens_details"`
Hit int `json:"prompt_cache_hit_tokens"`
Miss int `json:"prompt_cache_miss_tokens"`
}
// ---- non-streaming, cache read + cache write reported ----
resp := `{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"ok"}],"stop_reason":"end_turn",
"usage":{"input_tokens":1200,"cache_read_input_tokens":40000,
"cache_creation_input_tokens":500,"output_tokens":80}}`
out, err := vm.Transform("anthropic", "transform_response", resp)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("transform_response: %v", err)
}
// Each case decodes into a FRESH value: json.Unmarshal leaves fields absent
// from the payload untouched, so a reused struct would carry the previous
// case's prompt_tokens_details into a response that has none.
decode := func(out string) usage {
t.Helper()
var r struct {
TokenUsage usage `json:"token_usage"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(out), &r); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unmarshal: %v (%s)", err, out)
}
return r.TokenUsage
}
decodeChunk := func(out string) (usage, string) {
t.Helper()
var c struct {
Usage usage `json:"usage"`
FinishReason string `json:"finish_reason"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(out), &c); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unmarshal chunk: %v (%s)", err, out)
}
return c.Usage, c.FinishReason
}
u := decode(out)
if u.Prompt != 1200+40000+500 {
t.Errorf("prompt must sum fresh+cache_read+cache_creation (41700), got %d", u.Prompt)
}
if u.Total != u.Prompt+u.Completion {
t.Errorf("total %d != prompt %d + completion %d", u.Total, u.Prompt, u.Completion)
}
if u.Details == nil || u.Details.CachedTokens != 40000 {
t.Errorf("cached_tokens must carry cache_read (40000): %s", out)
}
if u.Details != nil && u.Details.CachedTokens > u.Prompt {
t.Errorf("cached_tokens %d > prompt %d implies a hit rate above 100%%",
u.Details.CachedTokens, u.Prompt)
}
if u.Hit != 40000 || u.Miss != 1200+500 {
t.Errorf("hit/miss split wrong: hit=%d miss=%d (want 40000/1700)", u.Hit, u.Miss)
}
// ---- a reported zero hit must stay distinguishable from "not reported" ----
zero := `{"content":[],"stop_reason":"end_turn","usage":{"input_tokens":100,"cache_read_input_tokens":0,"output_tokens":5}}`
out, err = vm.Transform("anthropic", "transform_response", zero)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if decode(out).Details == nil {
t.Errorf("a reported cache_read of 0 must still emit prompt_tokens_details: %s", out)
}
// An upstream that never mentions caching must not gain a fabricated split
// (justwoker reports only input_tokens/output_tokens plus its own cost fields).
none := `{"content":[],"stop_reason":"end_turn","usage":{"input_tokens":6931,"output_tokens":1}}`
out, err = vm.Transform("anthropic", "transform_response", none)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
plain := decode(out)
if plain.Details != nil {
t.Errorf("upstream reported no cache fields; details must be absent: %s", out)
}
if plain.Prompt != 6931 || plain.Total != 6932 {
t.Errorf("plain usage mismapped: %s", out)
}
// ---- streaming: message_delta carries the FINAL usage and must map cache ----
delta := `{"type":"message_delta","delta":{"stop_reason":"end_turn"},
"usage":{"input_tokens":1200,"cache_read_input_tokens":40000,"output_tokens":80}}`
out, err = vm.Transform("anthropic", "transform_stream_chunk", delta)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stream delta: %v", err)
}
du, fin := decodeChunk(out)
if du.Prompt != 41200 {
t.Errorf("stream final prompt must include cache_read: got %d", du.Prompt)
}
if du.Details == nil || du.Details.CachedTokens != 40000 {
t.Errorf("stream final usage dropped the cache split: %s", out)
}
if fin != "stop" {
t.Errorf("finish_reason regressed: %s", out)
}
// message_start's placeholder count must not suppress the later real one:
// justwoker reports input_tokens=160 at message_start and 6931 at
// message_delta, and the gateway's mergeUsage lets the later value win.
start := `{"type":"message_start","message":{"usage":{"input_tokens":160,"output_tokens":1}}}`
out, err = vm.Transform("anthropic", "transform_stream_chunk", start)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("message_start: %v", err)
}
if su, _ := decodeChunk(out); su.Prompt != 160 {
t.Errorf("message_start usage lost: %s", out)
}
// A usage-less chunk must stay silent rather than reporting zeros.
quiet := `{"type":"message_start","message":{}}`
out, err = vm.Transform("anthropic", "transform_stream_chunk", quiet)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if strings.Contains(out, "usage") {
t.Errorf("usage-less chunk must not emit a usage object: %s", out)
}
}

View File

@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
"log"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
@ -24,6 +25,20 @@ import (
"llmsproxy/internal/types"
)
// proxyFor picks the transport proxy for one source. An explicit per-source
// proxy_url wins (e.g. clash on 127.0.0.1:7890 for a geo-blocked upstream);
// otherwise fall back to the process-wide env proxy, which is direct by
// default.
func proxyFor(cfg config.Source) func(*http.Request) (*url.URL, error) {
if cfg.ProxyURL != "" {
proxyURL, err := url.Parse(cfg.ProxyURL)
if err == nil {
return http.ProxyURL(proxyURL)
}
}
return http.ProxyFromEnvironment
}
// ---- per-(source,model) scheduling state ----
// ModelState is the scheduling state of one (source, model) pair: a soft
@ -388,8 +403,11 @@ func New(cfg config.Source, vm *lua.VM) *Provider {
// Shared transport: ResponseHeaderTimeout bounds how long we wait for the
// first response byte (applies to both paths); the stream client has no
// client-level Timeout so the SSE body can run past the header timeout.
// A per-source ProxyURL (e.g. clash on 127.0.0.1:7890) overrides the
// process-wide env proxy for upstreams that are geo/IP-blocked; sources
// without one keep http.ProxyFromEnvironment (direct by default).
tr := &http.Transport{
Proxy: http.ProxyFromEnvironment,
Proxy: proxyFor(cfg),
DialContext: (&net.Dialer{Timeout: 30 * time.Second, KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second}).DialContext,
ForceAttemptHTTP2: true,
MaxIdleConns: 100,